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Abstract
Under dynamic random utility, an agent (or population of agents) solves a dynamic
decision problem subject to evolving private information. We analyze the fully general and
non-parametric model, axiomatically characterizing the implied dynamic stochastic choice
behavior. A key new feature relative to static or i.i.d. versions of the model is that when
private information displays serial correlation, choices appear history dependent : differ-
ent sequences of past choices reflect different private information of the agent, and hence
typically lead to different distributions of current choices. Our axiomatization imposes
discipline on the form of history dependence that can arise under arbitrary serial correla-
tion. Dynamic stochastic choice data lets us distinguish central models that coincide in
static domains, in particular private information in the form of utility shocks vs. learn-
ing, and to study inherently dynamic phenomena such as choice persistence. We relate
our model to specifications of utility shocks widely used in empirical work, highlighting
new modeling tradeoffs in the dynamic discrete choice literature. Finally, we extend our
characterization to allow past consumption to directly affect the agent’s utility process,
accommodating models of habit formation and experimentation.
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Random utility models are widely used throughout economics. In the static model, the agent
chooses from her choice set after observing the realization of a random utility function U . In the
dynamic model, the agent solves a dynamic decision problem, subject to a stochastic process
(Ut) of utilities. The key feature of the model is an informational asymmetry between the
agent (who knows her realized utility) and the analyst (who does not). In both the static and
dynamic setting, this asymmetry gives rise to choice behavior that appears stochastic to the
analyst but is deterministic from the point of view of the agent.1
In the dynamic setting, the informational asymmetry has an additional key implication:
If (Ut) displays serial correlation, then choices will appear history dependent to the analyst.
For example, we expect the agent’s probability of voting Republican in 2020 to be different
conditional on voting Republican in 2016 than conditional on voting Democrat in 2016. This
is because her past voting behavior reveals relevant information about her past political prefer-
ences, which we expect to be at least somewhat persistent. History dependence due to serially
correlated private information is pervasive in applications, from education and career choices
in labor economics to consumer brand choices in marketing. Recognizing that “ignoring serial
correlation in unobservables [...] can lead to serious misspecification errors” (Norets, 2009),
the dynamic discrete choice literature studying these settings has developed and estimated a
number of models that can accommodate history dependent choices. However, as highlighted
by Pakes (1986), a limitation of these models is that they rely on specific parametric forms
of serial correlation, making it “difficult to determine the robustness of the conclusions to the
stochastic assumptions chosen.”
This paper provides the first analysis of the fully general and non-parametric model of dy-
namic random utility. Our contribution is threefold: First, we axiomatically characterize the
implied dynamic stochastic choice behavior, imposing discipline on the form of history depen-
dence that can arise under arbitrary serially correlated private information. Our axiomatization
answers for the dynamic model a question that has given rise to an extensive literature in the
static setting (see Section 8.1) while overcoming a number of challenges that are new to the dy-
namic domain. Second, dynamic stochastic choice data allows us to distinguish central models
that coincide in static domains, in particular private information in the form of utility shocks vs.
learning; and to study important new distinctions inherent to dynamic settings, in particular
the difference between history dependence due to serially correlated private information and
consumption dependence, where past consumption affects current choices by directly shaping
the agent’s utility process. Finally, our analysis sheds new light on modeling tradeoffs in the
dynamic discrete choice literature.
1An equivalent interpretation of the model is that the analyst observes a fixed population of heterogeneous
individuals. Throughout the paper, we use “the agent” to refer to both interpretations.
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Our model generalizes the static random expected utility framework of Gul and Pesendorfer
(2006) to decision trees as defined by Kreps and Porteus (1978). Each period t, the agent chooses
from a menu of lotteries over current consumptions and continuation menus by maximizing a
random vNM utility Ut. A history h
t−1 = (A0, p0, . . . , At−1, pt−1) summarizes that the agent
chose lottery p0 from menu A0, then was faced with A1 and chose p1, and so on. Observed
behavior at t is given by a history dependent choice distribution ρt(·|ht−1), specifying the choice
frequency ρt(pt, At|ht−1) of pt from any menu At that can arise after ht−1.
Turning to the axiomatic characterization, our first main insight is the following: The fact
that history dependence arises purely as a result of serial correlation in (Ut) entails two history
independence conditions. Each condition identifies simple equivalence classes of histories that
reveal the same private information to the analyst; if ht−1 and gt−1 are equivalent, then ρt(·|ht−1)
and ρt(·|gt−1) are required to coincide. The first condition, contraction history independence,
imposes equivalence if ht−1 can be obtained from gt−1 by eliminating some options that are
irrelevant to choices along the history gt−1. The second condition, linear history independence,
imposes equivalence if ht−1 and gt−1 are “linear combinations” of each other. Theorem 1 shows
that our most general model, dynamic random expected utility (DREU), is fully characterized by
these two independence conditions along with a continuity condition and Gul and Pesendorfer’s
(2006) axioms that ensure static random utility maximization at each history.
In DREU, the stochastic process (Ut) is unrestricted. We next study the important special
case of a dynamically sophisticated agent who has separable preferences over current consump-
tion and continuation problems and is forward-looking with a correct assessment of option value.
This allows us to distinguish evolving utility, where the agent faces taste shocks that evolve ran-
domly over time, from its special case, gradual learning, in which the agent learns over time
about her fixed but unknown tastes—two forms of private information that are indistinguish-
able in the static setting. To this end, we introduce a novel incomplete and history dependent
revealed preference relation that infers from the agent’s choices her preference conditional on
any particular realization of her private information. Evolving utility is then characterized by
adapting axioms from the menu-preference literature: separability, preference for flexibility, and
dynamic sophistication (Theorem 2). The additional behavioral content of gradual learning is
encapsulated by a consumption stationarity axiom, reflecting the martingale property of beliefs,
along with a constant intertemporal tradeoff axiom (Theorem 3).
Proposition 1 establishes identification results for the three representations. In DREU,
the agent’s ordinal private information is uniquely pinned down; evolving utility, and more
so gradual learning, impose discipline on the cardinal private information (Ut); additionally,
gradual learning allows for unique identification of the discount factor.
A key challenge throughout our analysis is the following “limited observability” problem:
In contrast with the static setting, where the analyst observes choices from all possible menus,
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in the dynamic setting each history of past choices restricts the set of current and future choice
problems. Over time, this severely limits the history-dependent choice data on which axioms
can be imposed and from which (Ut) can be inferred. We overcome this problem by means of the
following extrapolation procedure (Definition 3): For any menu At and history h
t−1 that does
not lead to At, we define the agent’s counterfactual choice distribution from At following h
t−1
by extrapolating from the situation where the agent makes the sequence of choices captured by
ht−1, but knows that, with some exogenous probability, another sequence of choices that does
lead to menu At will be implemented instead. Invoking linear history independence, the latter
situation can be specified such that it reveals the same private information as the original
choice sequence ht−1, thus justifying the extrapolation. This extrapolation procedure relies
crucially on the inclusion of lotteries as choice objects. We discuss the connection with similar
uses of plausibly exogenous randomization to perform counterfactual analyses in empirical and
experimental work.
Section 6 discusses the relationship with the dynamic discrete choice (DDC) literature. The
uniqueness results that we develop are complementary to identification results in the DDC
literature. Moreover, we contrast our evolving utility representation with the i.i.d. DDC model,
which is a workhorse model for structural estimation. While also a special case of DREU, the
latter is incompatible with evolving utility, as the two make opposite predictions about option
value. In the evolving utility model the agent has a positive option value: she likes bigger
menus, as they provide her with more flexibility, and wants to make her decisions as late as
she can to condition on as much information as possible. On the other hand, the i.i.d. DDC
agent sometimes prefers to commit to smaller menus and, more often than not, prefers to make
her decisions as early as possible, thus displaying a negative option value. This points to a
modeling tradeoff between the desirable statistical properties of the i.i.d. DDC model and a key
feature of Bayesian rationality, positive option value.
Finally, in Section 7, we extend our model to additionally allow past consumption to di-
rectly influence the agent’s current behavior by shaping her current preferences. We refer to this
as consumption dependence, while reserving the term history dependence for the phenomenon
discussed so far, where observed current behavior depends on past choices (rather than actual
consumption) because different choices reflect different private information. Prominent exam-
ples of consumption dependence include habit formation, where consuming a certain good in
the past may make the agent like it more in the present; and active learning/experimentation,
where the agent’s consumption provides information to her about some payoff-relevant state of
the world. Making use of the fact that each chosen lottery can result in multiple consumption
outcomes, we adapt our characterization to this setting, providing behavioral foundations for
these models and distinguishing history from consumption dependence.
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2 Static vs. Dynamic Random Utility
For any set Y , denote by K(Y ) the set of all nonempty finite subsets of Y and by ∆(Y ) the set of
all simple (i.e., finite support) lotteries on Y ; henceforth, all references to lotteries are to simple
lotteries. Whenever Y is a separable metric space, we endow ∆(Y ) with the induced Prokhorov
metric and K(Y ) with the Hausdorff metric. Let RY denote the set of vNM utility indices
over Y , which is endowed with the product topology and its induced Borel sigma-algebra. For
any U,U ′ ∈ RY , write U ≈ U ′ if U and U ′ represent the same preference on ∆(Y ). For any
finite set of lotteries A ∈ K(∆(Y )), let M(A,U) := argmaxp∈A U(p) denote the set of lotteries
in A that maximize U , where U(p) :=
∑
y∈supp(p) U(y)p(y) denotes the expected utility of any
p ∈ ∆(Y ). For any A,B ∈ K(∆(Y )) and α ∈ [0, 1], define the α-mixture of A and B by
αA+ (1− α)B := {αp+ (1− α)q : p ∈ A, q ∈ B} ∈ K(∆(Y )).
2.1 Static Random Utility
We first briefly review the static model of random expected utility that will serve as the building
block of our dynamic representation at each history. As mentioned in the Introduction, there
are two equivalent interpretations of the model: a single agent with a random utility function or
a population of agents with heterogeneous utilities. The model is based on Gul and Pesendorfer
(2006), but allows for an infinite outcome space; this extension is necessary for our purposes,
because in the dynamic setting the period-t outcome space Xt, consisting of all pairs of current
consumptions and continuation menus, will be infinite in all but the final period.
2.1.1 Agent’s problem
Let X be an arbitrary separable metric space of outcomes. The agent makes choices from
menus, which are finite sets of lotteries over X; the set of all menus is A := K(∆(X)). Denote
a typical menu by A and a typical lottery by p. Let (Ω,F∗, µ) be a finitely-additive probability
space. In each state of the world, the agent’s choices maximize her expected utility subject to
her private information. Her payoff-relevant private information is captured by a sigma-algebra
F ⊆ F∗ and an F -measurable random vNM utility index U : Ω→ RX . In case of indifference,
ties are broken by a random vNM index W : Ω→ RX , which is measurable with respect to F∗.
Thus, when faced with menu A, the agent chooses lottery p in state ω if and only if p maximizes
U(ω) in A and, in case of ties, additionally maximizes W (ω) among the U(ω)-maximizers; that
is, p ∈M(M(A,U(ω)),W (ω)).
For tractability, we follow Ahn and Sarver (2013) in assuming that the agent’s payoff-
relevant private informaton (F , U) is simple, i.e., (i) F is generated by a finite partition such
that µ(F(ω)) > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω, where F(ω) denotes the cell of the partition that contains
ω; and (ii) each U(ω) is nonconstant and U(ω) 6≈ U(ω′) whenever F(ω) 6= F(ω′). Moreover,
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the tie-breaker W is proper,2 ensuring that under W ties occur with probability 0 in each menu;
that is, µ({ω ∈ Ω : |M(A,W (ω))| = 1}) = 1 for all A ∈ A.
2.1.2 Analyst’s problem
The analyst does not observe the agent’s private information and thus cannot condition on
events in F (equivalently, in the population interpretation, the analyst does not observe the
identities of the agents, just aggregate choice frequencies). Because of this informational asym-
metry, the agent’s choices appear stochastic to the analyst.3 His observations are summarized
by a stochastic choice rule on A, i.e., a map ρ : A → ∆(∆(X)) such that
∑
p∈A ρ(p,A) = 1
for all A ∈ A. Here ρ(p,A) denotes the frequency with which the agent chooses lottery p when
faced with menu A. If the agent behaves as in the previous section, then the event that the
agent chooses p from A is C(p,A) := {ω ∈ Ω : p ∈M(M(A,U(ω)),W (ω))}. Thus, the analyst’s
observations are consistent with the previous section if ρ(p,A) = µ(C(p,A)) for all p and A.
Definition 1. A static random expected utility (REU) representation of the stochastic choice
rule ρ is a tuple (Ω,F∗, µ,F , U,W ) such that (Ω,F∗, µ) is a finitely-additive probability space,
the sigma-algebra F ⊆ F∗ and the F -measurable utility U : Ω → RX are simple, the F∗-
measurable tiebreaker W : Ω→ RX is proper, and ρ(p,A) = µ(C(p,A)) for all p and A.
2.1.3 Characterization
For finite outcome spaces X, static REU representations have been characterized by Gul and
Pesendorfer (2006) and Ahn and Sarver (2013). As a preliminary technical contribution, we
extend their characterization to arbitrary separable metric spaces X. The first four conditions
of the following axiom are the same as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2006). The fifth condition is a
slight modification of the finiteness condition in Ahn and Sarver (2013).
Axiom 0. (Random Expected Utility)
(i). Regularity : If A ⊆ A′, then for all p ∈ A, ρ(p;A) ≥ ρ(p;A′).
(ii). Linearity : For any A, p ∈ A, λ ∈ (0, 1), and q, ρ(p;A) = ρ(λp+(1−λ)q;λA+(1−λ){q}).
(iii). Extremeness : For any A, ρ(extA;A) = 1.4
(iv). Mixture Continuity : ρ(·;αA+ (1− α)A′) is continuous in α for all A,A′.
2This property is sometimes called “regular” in the literature; we use the term “proper” to avoid confusion
with the Regularity axiom (Axiom 0 (i)) below.
3If the analyst observed the true state, choices would appear deterministic and could be summarized by a
vNM preference %ω.
4Here extA denotes the set of extreme points of A.
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(v). Finiteness : There is K > 0 such that for all A, there is B ⊆ A with |B| ≤ K such that for
every p ∈ Ar B, there are sequences pn →m p and Bn →m B with ρ(pn; {pn} ∪ Bn) = 0
for all n.
For condition (iv), α 7→ ρ(·;αA + (1 − α)A′) is viewed as a map from [0, 1] to ∆(∆(X)),
where ∆(∆(X)) is endowed with the topology of weak convergence induced by the Prokhorov
metric on ∆(X). For condition (v), convergence in mixture, denoted →m, on ∆(X) and A is
defined as follows: For any p ∈ ∆(X) and sequence {pn}n∈N ⊆ ∆(X), we write pn →m p if
there exists q ∈ ∆(X) and a sequence {αn}n∈N with αn → 0 such that pn = αnq+ (1−αn)p for
all n. Similarly, for any sequence {Bn}n∈N ⊆ A, we write Bn →m p if there exists B ∈ A and
a sequence {αn}n∈N with αn → 0 such that Bn = αnB + (1− αn){p} for all n. Finally, for any
A ∈ A and sequence (An)n∈N ⊆ A, we write An →m A if for each p ∈ A, there is a sequence
{Bnp }n∈N ⊆ A such that Bnp →m p and An = ∪p∈ABnp for all n.
Theorem 0. The stochastic choice rule ρ on A admits an REU representation if and only if ρ
satisfies Axiom 0.
Proof. See Supplementary Appendix F. 
2.2 Dynamic Random Utility
In many economic applications, the agent solves a dynamic decision problem subject to evolving,
and in general serially correlated, private information. As in the static model, an equivalent
interpretation is in terms of a population of agents with heterogeneous and evolving utilities,
and we will move freely between the two interpretations.5 The following two examples illustrate
some new features of the dynamic setting on which our formal analysis will expand.
Example 1 (Brand choice dynamics). A large marketing literature studies consumer brand
choice dynamics. A widely documented phenomenon is consumption persistence, whereby con-
sumers who chose brand z yesterday are more likely to choose z again today than consumers
who chose z′ yesterday. Our analysis is helpful in distinguishing various explanations of this
phenomenon.
First, analogous to the voting example in the introduction, one possible explanation is that
consumers’ tastes (ut) display persistence, so that consumers who preferred z yesterday are also
more likely to prefer it today. Here past consumption has no causal connection with current
consumption; it simply provides information about a consumer’s preferences to the analyst. We
refer to this phenomenon as history dependence. Our axioms in Section 3.1 impose limits on
5A special case of the model where all information is resolved at the beginning of time corresponds to a
population of heterogeneous agents with fully persistent preferences, or a single agent with random but fully
persistent preferences.
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how much history dependence the analyst can observe as a consequence of serially correlated
utilities. In addition, Section 5.2 characterizes precisely which form of taste persistence in (ut)
gives rise to consumption persistence.
An alternative explanation is consumption dependence, where consuming z yesterday directly
affects the consumer’s utility today, for example due to a process of habit formation. Our
baseline model excludes this direct effect and assumes that utility does not depend on past
consumption. However, in Section 7 we extend our characterization to additionally allow for
consumption dependence, identifying precisely when the analyst must attribute a causal role
to past consumption.
A further question concerns different interpretations of serially correlated utilities. The most
general possibility is that the agent is subject to arbitrary correlated taste shocks. An important
special case of this (e.g., Erdem and Keane 1996) is a consumer with a fixed but unknown utility
ũ, about which she learns over time; in this case, ut represents her expectation of ũ given period
t information. On static domains, a consumer with random taste shocks is indistinguishable
from one that receives signals about a fixed state of the world. However, we show that in the
dynamic setting the learning model has additional behavioral implications, which we identify in
Section 4. Moreover, in the case of learning, Section 7 again enables us to distinguish between
learning that is independent of past consumption (e.g., learning from advertising in Erdem and
Keane 1996) and active learning/experimentation, where past consumption itself is the source
of information (e.g., learning from experience in Erdem and Keane 1996). N
In many dynamic settings, the agent’s choices today also affect her opportunity sets tomor-
row, giving rise to additional questions.
Example 2 (School choice). A growing literature in labor economics studies individuals’ school
and curriculum choices, recognizing the importance of such choices for eventual labor market
outcomes. As a stylized example, consider Figure 1 (left). Here a parent first decides whether
to enroll her child in one of two elementary schools, which differ along many decision-relevant
dimensions. Upon enrolling, the parent must decide between a number of after-school care
options. In either case, she could enroll the child in a high quality but high cost private after-
school center (P) or stay at home/leave the child with relatives (H); additionally, school 1,
unlike school 2, offers its own (more basic and lower cost) after-school program (S).
In this setting, history dependence can take the form of a dynamic selection effect, whereby
parents’ after-school choices differ across schools because parents with different preferences
select into different schools. Failure to account for such dynamic selection may lead to mis-
specified models, including spurious violations of random utility. For example, suppose choice
frequencies for each after-school option are as in Figure 1 (left); in particular, the share of
parents choosing the private program is larger at school 1 (30%) than school 2 (20%). Ignoring





























Figure 1: School choice.
as it violates Regularity, Axiom 0 (i). However, it is entirely consistent with dynamic random
utility maximization, because under serially correlated private information the preferences of
parents at each school will differ. For example, it could be that parents for whom option H
is relatively more costly select disproportionately into school 1 because it expands their set of
outside-the-home options and some of these parents subsequently choose the private program
after obtaining additional information; or a preference for the specific characteristics of school
2 may happen to be strongly correlated with a preference for at-home child care. In Section 3
we will characterize precisely what kind of choice behavior is consistent with dynamic random
(expected) utility, showing in particular that the static REU axioms are valid as long as the
analyst conditions on past histories.
Another implication of history dependence is limited observability : Unlike in the static
setting, where the analyst has (at least in principle) access to choice frequencies from all menus,
in the dynamic setting certain past choices rule out certain future menus, so that over time the
analyst observes choices from a more and more limited domain. For example, we cannot observe
the counterfactual frequencies with which parents at school 1 would choose from the set {H, P}
if S were not available to them; and given dynamic selection, we cannot simply infer these from
the corresponding choice probabilities at school 2. In practice, however, many schools ration
their seats via lotteries, a fact that is widely exploited in the empirical literature on school
choice to generate quasi-experimental variation.6 This is illustrated in Figure 1 (right), where
6E.g., Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Narita, and Pathak (forthcoming); Angrist, Hull, Pathak, and Walters (forth-
coming); Deming (2011); Deming, Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2014).
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each application to school 1 is successful with probability λ and the parent must select school 2
otherwise. We will see in Section 3.1 that the analyst can (under expected utility) extrapolate
the choices of school 1 parents from the set {H, P} by looking at choices of parents who applied
to school 1 but were rejected by the lottery. N
In what follows, we develop and analyze a general model of dynamic random utility that
encompasses these and similar examples.
2.2.1 Agent’s problem
The agent faces a decision tree, as defined by Kreps and Porteus (1978). There are finitely
many periods t = 0, 1, . . . , T . There is a finite set Z of instantaneous consumptions. Each
period t, the agent chooses from a period-t menu, which is a finite set of lotteries over the
period-t outcome space Xt. The spaces Xt are defined recursively. The final period outcome
space XT := Z is just the space of instantaneous consumptions; the set of all period-T menus
is AT := K(∆(XT )). In all earlier periods t ≤ T − 1, the outcome space Xt := Z × At+1
consists of all pairs of current period consumptions and next period continuation menus; the
set of period-t menus is At := K(∆(Xt)).7 Denote a typical period-t lottery by pt ∈ ∆(Xt) and
a typical menu by At ∈ At. The agent’s choice of pt ∈ At determines both her instantaneous
consumption zt and the menu At+1 from which she will choose next period; let p
Z
t ∈ ∆(Z) and
pAt ∈ ∆(At+1) denote the respective marginal distributions.
As in the static model, let (Ω,F∗, µ) be a finitely-additive probability space. Under dynamic
random expected utility (DREU), in each state of the world and in each period, the agent’s
choices maximize her expected utility subject to her dynamically evolving private information.
The agent’s payoff-relevant private information is captured by a filtration (Ft)0≤t≤T ⊆ F∗ and
an Ft-adapted process of random vNM utility indices Ut : Ω → RXt over Xt. This allows for
arbitrary serial correlation of utilities, but does not allow the utility process to depend on past
consumption; Section 7 relaxes the latter restriction. In case of indifference, ties at each t are
broken by a random F∗-measurable vNM utility index Wt : Ω→ Xt, where we impose dynamic
analogs of simplicity and properness that we define at the end of this section. Thus, as before,
when faced with menu At in period t, the agent chooses lottery pt in state ω if and only if
pt ∈M(M(At, Ut(ω)),Wt(ω)).
DREU is a very general model because it imposes no particular structure on the family (Ut).
This is the most parsimonious setting in which to isolate the behavioral implications of serially
correlated private information. DREU could also accommodate various behavioral effects, such
as temptation or certain forms of “mistakes,” which in the static setting are indistinguishable
7A small technical difference from Kreps and Porteus (1978) is that they use Borel instead of simple lotteries
and compact instead of finite menus, but as in their setting we can verify recursively that each Xt is a separable
metric space under the appropriate topologies (see Lemma 12).
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from random utility maximization. However, the following important special case rules out
these possibilities.
Evolving utility captures a dynamically sophisticated agent who correctly takes into account
the evolution of her future preferences. There is an Ft-adapted process of random felicity
functions ut : Ω→ RZ over instantaneous consumptions and a discount factor δ > 0 such that
UT = uT and Ut for t ≤ T is given by the Bellman equation







Finally, as discussed in Example 1, an important special case of evolving utility arises when
the agent has a fixed but unknown felicity about which she learns over time. In this gradual
learning model there is a F∗-measurable random felicity ũ : Ω→ RZ such that for all t8
ut = E[ũ|Ft]. (2)
For all three models, we impose the following dynamic analogs of simplicity and proper-
ness. The pair (Ft, Ut)0≤t≤T is simple, i.e., (i) each Ft is generated by a finite partition
such that µ(Ft(ω)) > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω, where Ft(ω) again denotes the cell of the par-
tition that contains ω; and (ii) each Ut(ω) is nonconstant, and Ut(ω) 6≈ Ut(ω′) whenever
Ft(ω) 6= Ft(ω′) and Ft−1(ω) = Ft−1(ω′).9 The tiebreakers (Wt)0≤t≤T are proper, i.e., (i)
µ({ω ∈ Ω : |M(At,Wt(ω))| = 1}) = 1 for all At ∈ At; (ii) conditional on FT (ω), W0, . . . ,WT
are independent; and (iii) µ(Wt ∈ Bt|FT (ω)) = µ(Wt ∈ Bt|Ft(ω)) for all t and measurable Bt.10
2.2.2 Analyst’s problem
As in the static setting, the agent’s choices in each period t appear stochastic to the analyst,
because he does not have access to the agent’s private information. The novel feature of the
dynamic setting is that the analyst can observe the agent’s past choices. With serially correlated
utilities, these choices convey some information about the payoff-relevant private information
Ft, so that the agent’s behavior additionally appears history dependent to the analyst.
This is captured by a dynamic stochastic choice rule ρ, which for any period t and history
of past choices summarizes the observed choice frequencies from any menu At that can arise
after this history. We define choice frequencies and histories recursively. Choice frequencies
8Gradual learning is a model of passive learning, because the agent’s choices do not affect her filtration Ft.
The more general model in Section 7 accommodates as a special case active learning/experimentation, where
each period the agent obtains additional information from her consumption zt.
9For t = 0, we let Ft−1(ω) := Ω for all ω.
10(ii) rules out additional serial correlation of tiebreakers, over and above the serial correlation inherent in
the agent’s payoff-relevant private information FT (ω). (iii) ensures that to the extent that period-t tie breaking
relies on payoff-relevant private information, it can rely only on the information Ft(ω) available at t.
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in period 0 are given by a (static) stochastic choice rule ρ0 : A0 → ∆(∆(X0)) on A0; thus,∑
p0∈A0 ρ0(p0;A0) = 1 for all A0 and ρ0(p0;A0) denotes the frequency with which the agent
chooses lottery p0 when faced with menu A0. The choices that occur with strictly positive
probability under ρ0 define the set of all period 0 histories H0 := {(A0, p0) : ρ0(p0, A0) > 0}.
For any history h0 = (A0, p0) ∈ H0, let A1(h0) := supp pA0 denote the set of period 1 menus
that follow h0 with positive probability.
For t ≥ 1 the objects Ht and At+1(ht) are defined recursively. For any history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1,
choice frequencies following ht−1 are given by a stochastic choice rule ρt(·|ht−1) : At(ht−1) →
∆(∆(Xt)) on the set At(ht−1) of period t menus that follow ht−1 with positive probability; thus,∑
pt∈At ρt(pt;At | h
t−1) = 1 for all At ∈ At(ht−1) and ρt(pt;At | ht−1) denotes the frequency
with which the agent chooses pt when faced with menu At after history h
t−1. The set of period-
t histories is Ht := {(ht−1, At, pt) : ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 and At ∈ At(ht−1) and ρt(pt;At|ht−1) > 0};
this contains all sequences (A0, p0, . . . , At, pt) of choices up to time t that arise with positive
probability. Finally, for each t ≤ T − 1, the set of period t + 1 menus that follow history
ht = (ht−1, At, pt) with positive probability is At+1(ht) := supp pAt and the set of period-t
histories that lead to At+1 with positive probability is Ht(At+1) := {ht ∈ Ht : At+1 ∈ At+1(ht)}.
Two features of the primitive are worth noting: First, reflecting limited observability, for
each t ≥ 1 and history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, the stochastic choice rule ρt(·|ht−1) is defined only on
the subset At(ht−1) ⊆ At of period t menus that arise with positive probability after ht−1—
typically very few menus. Nevertheless, Section 3.2 will show that under DREU the analyst can
extrapolate from ρt(·|ht−1) to a well-defined stochastic choice rule on the whole of At. Second,
histories only summarize the agent’s past choices of pk from Ak and do not keep track of realized
consumptions zk ∈ supp pZk . This is without loss in the current model where utilities are not
affected by past consumption, but will be relaxed in the model with consumption-dependence
in Section 7.
Under DREU, the private information revealed to the analyst by history ht−1 =
(A0, p0, . . . , At−1, pt−1) is given by the event C(h
t−1) :=
⋂t−1
k=0C(pk, Ak), where for each k the
event C(pk, Ak) := {ω ∈ Ω : pk ∈ M(M(Ak, Uk(ω)),Wk(ω))} that the agent chooses pk when
faced with Ak is defined as in the static model.
11 Thus, the analyst’s observations are consistent
with DREU if the frequency with which the agent chooses pt from At following history h
t−1 is
equal to the conditional probability µ [C(pt, At)|C(ht−1)] of the event C(pt, At) given C(ht−1).
The following definition summarizes the dynamic model:
Definition 2. A dynamic random expected utility (DREU) representation of the dynamic
stochastic choice rule ρ is a tuple (Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, Ut,Wt)0≤t≤T ) such that (Ω,F∗, µ) is a finitely-
additive probability space, the filtration (Ft) ⊆ F∗ and the Ft-adapted utility process
11Note that C(ht−1) does not keep track of the random realizations of menus Ak ∈ supp pAk along the sequence
ht−1, as this exogenous randomness does not reveal any information about the agent’s private information.
12
Ut : Ω → RXt are simple, the F∗-measurable tiebreaking process Wt : Ω → RXt is proper,






where for t = 0, we abuse notation by letting C(ht−1) := Ω and ρ0(p0;A0|h−1) := ρ0(p0;A0).
An evolving utility representation is a DREU representation along with an Ft-adapted pro-
cess of felicities ut : Ω → RZ and a discount factor δ > 0 such that (1) holds. A gradual
learning representation is an evolving utility representation along with an F∗-measurable felic-
ity ũ : Ω→ RZ such that (2) holds.
2.2.3 Discussion
Lotteries as choice objects: In addition to allowing us to model choice behavior under
risk, including lotteries in the domain of choice simplifies our analysis, as it allows us to rely
on the static framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) instead of the more complicated one
of Falmagne (1978). Lotteries play a similar technical role in the original work of Kreps and
Porteus (1978), by letting them rely on the vNM framework.12 From a conceptual point of
view, we will see in Section 3.2 that lotteries are crucial in overcoming the aforementioned
limited observability problem and we illustrate the availability of lotteries for this purpose
with examples from experimental and empirical work. Relatedly, lotteries are key in inferring
the agent’s history dependent revealed preference in Section 4.1 and in disentangling history
dependence from consumption dependence in Section 7.
Interpretation of data: As with static stochastic choice, the dynamic stochastic choice
rule ρ admits two equivalent interpretations: The analyst either (i) repeatedly observes a single
agent solve each decision tree;13 or (ii) observes a large population of agents (with heterogeneous
and evolving utilities) solve each decision tree once. In either case, ρ captures the limiting choice
frequencies as the number of observations/population size tends to infinity. Abstracting from
the sampling error in this manner is also typical in the econometric analysis of identification.
In any application, the data set will of course be finite. However, studying behavior on the
full domain is an important step in uncovering all the assumptions that are behind the model;
moreover, statistical tests are often directly inspired by axioms.14
Dynamic stochastic choice vs. ex ante preference: In our framework, the analyst
12Likewise, the ambiguity aversion literature extensively relies on the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) frame-
work rather than the more complicated one of Savage (1972); the notable exceptions include Gilboa (1987) and
Epstein (1999). Similarly, the menu-preference literature uses lotteries (e.g. Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini,
2001) to improve upon the uniqueness and comparative statics results of Kreps (1979).
13Here, the agent’s utilities are assumed to evolve according to the same process Ut at each observation.
14For example Hausman and McFadden (1984) develop a test of the IIA axiom that characterizes the logit
model. Likewise, Kitamura and Stoye (2016) develop axiom-based tests of the static random utility model.
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observes the distribution of choices at each node of each decision tree; as we pointed out,
the randomness in choice comes from an informational asymmetry between the agent and the
analyst that occurs in each period. By contrast, a widespread approach in the existing dynamic
decision theory literature (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004; Krishna and Sadowski, 2014) is to
only study a deterministic preference over decision trees at a hypothetical ex ante stage that
features no informational asymmetry15 or abstracts away from other forces (e.g., temptation)
that the agent anticipates to affect her choices in actual decision trees.16 Compared with this
literature, our approach does not require such a hypothetical stage, and thus the primitive is
closer to actual data economists can observe. Moreover, considering choice behavior in each
period, not just at the beginning of time, allows us to study new phenomena such as history
dependence and consumption persistence. In Section 4.1 we show how to extract deterministic
preference relations from the stochastic choice data.
Role of axioms: In addition to their usual positive and normative role, we view our axioms
as serving an equally important purpose as conceptual tools that elucidate key properties of
any dynamic random utility model and facilitate comparisons between different versions of
the model. For example, our axioms in Section 3.1 clarify the nature of history dependence
that can arise under any dynamic random expected utility model; our axioms in Section 4.3
identify the additional behavioral content of gradual learning relative to evolving utility; and
our comparison of the evolving utility and i.i.d. DDC model in Section 6 draws on the axioms
to uncover that the two make opposite predictions about option value.
3 Characterization of DREU
DREU is characterized by four axioms, which we present in the following subsections. First, we
present two history independence axioms that capture the key new implications of the dynamic
model relative to the static one. Building on this, the next subsection shows how the analyst can
extrapolate from each ρt(·|ht−1) to an extended choice rule on the whole of At, thus overcoming
the limited observability problem. The final subsection then imposes the static REU conditions
as well as a technical history continuity axiom on this extended choice rule.
15Ahn and Sarver (2013) study a two-period model with a deterministic menu preference in the first period
and random choice from menus in the second period. Here too there is no informational asymmetry in the first
period.
16In the context of temptation, one exception is Noor (2011), but his is a stationary environment with no
informational asymmetry and the analyst observes deterministic choices at each node of the decision tree.
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3.1 History Independence Axioms
Our first two axioms identify two cases in which histories ht−1 and gt−1 reveal the same in-
formation to the analyst. Capturing the fact that history dependence arises in DREU only
through the private information revealed by past choices, the axioms require that period-t
choice behavior be the same after two such histories.
Given ht−1 = (A0, p0, ..., At−1, pt−1) ∈ Ht−1, let (ht−1−k , (A′k, p′k)) denote the sequence of the




k, ..., At−1, pt−1).
17 We say that gt−1 ∈ Ht−1 is contraction equivalent to
ht−1 if for some k, we have gt−1 = (ht−1−k , (Bk, pk)), where Ak ⊆ Bk and ρk(pk, Ak|hk−1) =
ρk(pk, Bk|hk−1).18 That is, gt−1 and ht−1 differ only in period k, where under gt−1, the agent
chooses lottery pk from menu Bk, while under h
t−1, she chooses the same lottery pk from the
contraction Ak ⊆ Bk; moreover, conditional on hk−1, the choice of pk from Ak and the choice
of pk from Bk occur with the same probability. Axiom 1 requires that choice behavior be the
same after ht−1 and gt−1.
Axiom 1 (Contraction History Independence). For all t ≤ T , if gt−1 ∈ Ht−1(At) is contraction
equivalent to ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(At), then ρt(·, At|ht−1) = ρt(·, At|gt−1).
To see the idea, suppose for simplicity that T = 1, in which case the axiom requires that
for any p0 ∈ A0 ⊆ B0 if ρ0(p0, A0) = ρ0(p0, B0), then ρ1(·, A1|A0, p0) = ρ1(·, A1|B0, p0) for any
A1 ∈ supp pA0 . In general, the event that p0 is the best element of menu B0 is a subset of the
event that p0 is the best element of the smaller menu A0 ⊆ B0; thus, observing g0 = (B0, p0)
may reveal more information about the agent’s possible period-0 preferences than h0 = (A0, p0).
However, since we additionally know that ρ0(p0, A0) = ρ0(p0, B0), the event that p0 is best in
A0 but not in B0 must have probability 0; in other words, we must put zero probability on
any preference that selects p0 from A0 but not from B0. Given this, h
0 and g0 reveal the same
information, and hence call for the same predictions for period-1 choices. The following example
illustrates this with a concrete story in the population setting.
Example 3. There are two convenience stores, A and B, each carrying three types of milk
(whole, 2%, and 1%). Each store has a stable set of weekly customers whose stochastic process
of preferences is identical at both stores.19 Suppose that in week 0, store A’s delivery of 1%
milk breaks down unexpectedly. The purchasing shares at each store are given in Tables 1
and 2. Consider a customer of store A, Alice, and a customer of store B, Barbara, who both
buy whole milk in week 0. If in week 1 all types of milk are available again at both stores, then
Contraction History Independence implies that Alice and Barbara’s choice probabilities will be
the same. This is true because we have the same information about Alice and Barbara. Since
17In general this is not a history, but it is if A′k ∈ supp pAk−1 and Ak+1 ∈ supp p′Ak and ρk(p′k, A′k|hk−1) > 0.
18This induces an equivalence relation on Ht−1 by taking the symmetric and transitive closure.










Table 2: Market shares at store B
at store A only whole and 2% milk were available in week 0, the possible week-0 preferences of
Alice are w  2  1 or w  1  2 or 1  w  2. By contrast, since store B stocked all three
types of milk, Barbara’s possible preferences are w  2  1 or w  1  2. However, since we
additionally know that the share of customers purchasing whole milk in week 0 was the same
at both stores, ρ0(w, {w, 1, 2}) = ρ0(w, {w, 2}) = 0.4, we can also conclude that no customers
had the ranking 1  w  2 in week 0. Therefore, the analyst’s prediction is the same, since the
stochastic process that governs the transition from week-0 to week-1 preferences is the same for
Barbara and Alice and in both cases the analyst conditions on exactly the same week-0 event
{w  2  1, w  1  2}. N
The second history independence axiom takes into account that the agent is an expected
utility maximizer. Under expected utility maximization, choosing pk from Ak reveals the same
information about the agent’s utility as choosing λpk + (1−λ)qk from λAk + (1−λ){qk}. More
generally, for a menu Bk, if we know that the agent chose some option of the form λpk+(1−λ)qk
from λAk +(1−λ)Bk but we do not know what qk was, this again reveals the same information
as choosing pk from Ak. This suggests the following notion of equivalence: We say that a finite
set of histories Gt−1 ⊆ Ht−1 is linearly equivalent to ht−1 = (A0, p0, ..., At−1, pt−1) ∈ Ht−1 if
Gt−1 = {(ht−1−k , (λAk + (1− λ)Bk, λpk + (1− λ)qk)) : qk ∈ Bk}
for some k, Bk, and λ ∈ (0, 1]. That is, Gt−1 is the collection of histories that differ from ht−1
only at period k: Under ht−1, the agent chooses pk from menu Ak, while G
t−1 summarizes all
possible choices of the form λpk + (1 − λ)qk from the menu λAk + (1 − λ)Bk. By the above
reasoning, Gt−1 reveals the same information about the agent as ht−1. Thus, Axiom 2 requires
period-t choice behavior following the set of histories Gt−1 to be the same as conditional on










to be the weighted average of all choice distributions ρt(·, At|gt−1) following histories in Gt−1,
where for each gt−1 = (Â0, p̂0, . . . , Ât−1, p̂t−1) its weight ρ(g
t−1) :=
∏t−1
k=0 ρk(p̂k, Âk|gk−1) corre-
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sponds to the probability of the sequence of choices summarized by gt−1.20
Axiom 2 (Linear History Independence). For all t ≤ T , if Gt−1 ⊆ Ht−1(At) is linearly equiva-
lent to ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(At), then ρt(·, At|ht−1) = ρt(·, At|Gt−1).
3.2 Limited Observability
Recall that unlike the static setting, where the analyst observes choices from all possible menus,
the dynamic setting presents a limited observability problem: At each history ht−1 of past
choices, ρt(·|ht−1) is only defined on the set At(ht−1) of menus that occur with positive proba-
bility after ht−1—typically very few menus. For the rest of the paper, it is key to overcome this
problem: Otherwise we do not have enough data to verify whether observed choices at history
ht−1 are consistent with random utility maximization or to identify whether the agent’s utility
process belongs to the evolving utility class or the more specific gradual learning class.
The inclusion of lotteries among the agent’s choice objects allows us to do so. The idea is to
use Linear History Independence to formalize the “linear extrapolation” procedure illustrated
in the school choice example (Example 2). Consider any menu At (e.g., the two-option menu
{H,P} in the example) and some history ht−1 that does not lead to At (e.g., choosing school 1).
We define the agent’s counterfactual choice distribution from At following h
t−1 by extrapolating
from the situation where she makes the sequence of choices captured by ht−1, but knows that
with some probability another sequence of choices (e.g., enroll in school 2) that does lead to
menu At will be implemented instead. More precisely, we consider a degenerate sequence d
t−1 =
({q0}, q0, . . . , {qt−1}, qt−1) such that At ∈ supp qAt−1 and replace ht−1 = (A0, p0, . . . , At−1, pt−1)
with gt−1 := λht−1 + (1 − λ)dt−1 where21 at every period k ≤ t − 1, the agent faces menu
λAk + (1− λ){qk} and chooses lottery λpk + (1− λ)qk.
As discussed preceding Linear History Independence, under expected utility maximization
the latter sequence of choices reveals the same information about the agent as ht−1. This
motivates extrapolating from gt−1 to define choice behavior following ht−1. Define the set of
degenerate period-(t − 1) histories by Dt−1 := {dt−1 ∈ Ht−1 : dt−1 = ({qk}, qk)t−1k=0 where qk ∈
∆(Xk)∀k ≤ t− 1}.
Definition 3. For any t ≥ 1, At ∈ At, and ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, define
ρh
t−1
t (·;At) := ρt(·;At|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1). (4)
20Note that ρ(gt−1) does not keep track of the probabilities p̂Ak (Âk+1), since these pertain to exogenous
randomization and do not reveal any private information.
21In order for λht−1 + (1 − λ)dt−1 := (λAk + (1 − λ){qk}, λpk + (1 − λ)qk)t−1k=0 to be a well-defined history,
it suffices that λAk + (1 − λ){qk} ∈ supp qAk−1 for all k = 1, . . . , t − 1. This can be ensured by appropriately
choosing each qk, working backwards from period t− 1.
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for some λ ∈ (0, 1] and dt−1 ∈ Dt−1 such that λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1 ∈ Ht−1(At).
It follows from Axiom 2 (Linear History Independence) that ρh
t−1
t (·;At) is well-defined:
Lemma 15 shows that the RHS of (4) does not depend on the specific choice of λ and dt−1.
Moreover, ρh
t−1
t (·;At) coincides with ρt(·;At|ht−1) whenever ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(At). In the following,
we do not distinguish between the extended and nonextended version of ρt and use ρt(·;At|ht−1)
to denote both.
As illustrated by Example 2 in the context of school choice, random assignment is preva-
lent in many real-world economic environments and is an important tool to obtain quasi-
experimental variation in the empirical literature. While this literature typically leverages such
random variation to identify the causal effect of current choices on next-period outcomes (e.g.,
test scores in the case of school choice), Definition 3 suggests exploiting it to make counterfac-
tual inferences about next-period choices. Even more readily, lotteries over next-period choice
problems can be generated in the laboratory, and a growing literature in experimental economics
makes use of this to perform extrapolation procedures akin to Definition 3.22
3.3 History-Dependent REU and History Continuity Axioms
For each ht−1, the extended choice distribution ρt(·|ht−1) from Definition 3 is a stochastic choice
rule on the whole of At. The next axiom imposes the standard static REU conditions from
Axiom 0 on each ρt(·|ht−1). Note that conditioning ρt on past histories is key here; without
controlling for past choices, choice behavior at time t will in general violate the REU axioms,
as illustrated in Example 2.
Axiom 3 (History-dependent REU). For all t ≤ T and ht−1, ρt(·|ht−1) satisfies Axiom 0.23
Our final axiom reflects the way in which tie-breaking can affect the observed choice distri-
bution. We first define menus and histories without ties directly from choice behavior. The idea
is that menus without ties are characterized by the fact that slightly perturbing their elements
has no effect on choice probabilities.24 We capture such perturbations using convergence in
mixture, as defined following Axiom 0.
22E.g., in a recent experimental study of temptation and self-control, Toussaert (2016) presents subjects with
lotteries over next-period menus to differentiate between so-called random Strotz agents and Gul and Pesendorfer
(2001) agents. For related uses of lotteries in lab experiments, see Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2015).
23Lemma 12 verifies that Xt is a separable metric space. Then Mixture Continuity and Finiteness make use
of the same convergence notions as defined following Axiom 0.
24Lu (2016) and Lu and Saito (2016) use an alternative approach, directly incorporating into the primitive a
collection of measurable sets that capture the absence of ties and defining choice probabilities only on measurable
subsets of each menu. Their approach requires that ties occur with probability either zero or one, so is not
applicable to our setting. Our perturbation-based approach is similar in spirit to Ahn and Sarver (2013).
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Definition 4. For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T and ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, the set of period-t menus without ties
conditional on history ht−1 is denoted A∗t (ht−1)25 and consists of all At ∈ At such that for any







t ∪ {pnt }|ht−1) = ρt(pt, At|ht−1).
For t = 0, we write A∗0 := A∗0(ht−1). The set of period t histories without ties is H∗t := {ht =
(A0, p0, . . . , At−1, pt−1) ∈ Ht : Ak ∈ A∗k(hk−1) for all k ≤ t}.
The following axiom relates choice distributions after nearby histories. To state this formally,
we extend convergence in mixture to histories: We say ht,n →m ht if ht,n = (An0 , pn0 , ..., Ant , pnt )
and ht = (A0, p0, ..., At, pt) satisfy A
n
k →m Ak and pnk →m pk for each k.
Axiom 4 (History Continuity). For all t ≤ T − 1, At+1, pt+1, and ht,
ρt+1(pt+1;At+1|ht) ∈ co{lim
n
ρt+1(pt+1;At+1|ht,n) : ht,n →m ht, ht,n ∈ H∗t}.
In general, if period t histories are slightly altered, we expect subsequent period t+ 1 choice
behavior to be adjusted continuously, except when there was tie-breaking in the past. If the
agent chose pt from At as a result of tie-breaking, then slightly altering the choice problem can
change the set of states at which pt would be chosen and hence lead to a discontinuous change in
the private information revealed by the choice of pt. The history continuity condition restricts
the types of discontinuities ρt+1 can admit, ruling out situations in which choices after some
history are completely unrelated to choices after any nearby history. Specifically, the fact that
choice behavior after ht can be expressed as a mixture of behavior after some nearby histories
without ties reflects the way in which the agent’s tie-breaking procedure may vary with her
payoff-relevant private information.
3.4 Representation Theorem
Theorem 1. For any dynamic stochastic choice rule ρ, the following are equivalent:
(i). ρ satisfies Axioms 1–4.
(ii). ρ admits a DREU representation.
The proof of Theorem 1 appears in Appendix B. We now sketch the argument for sufficiency
in the two-period setting (T = 1). Readers wishing to proceed directly to the analysis of evolving
utility and gradual learning may skip ahead to Section 4.
25Note that A∗t (ht−1) 6⊆ At(ht−1) because the first set contains all menus without ties (we use history ht−1
here only to determine where ties could occur) while the second set contains only menus that occur with positive









































Figure 2: Suppose S0 = {s10, s20, s30} with corresponding utilities U10 , U20 , U30 . Menu D0 is a separating
menu from which qi0 is chosen precisely in state s
i
0. In menu A0 = {p0, r0}, p0 is chosen with probability
1 in state s10; tied with r0 in s
2
0; and never chosen in s
3




2D0, p0 is replaced with three
copies {p10, p20, p30}: Each pi0 is chosen in state si0 with the same probability with which p0 is chosen at si0
and is never chosen otherwise. Step 3 shows choice probabilities following (Â0, p
i
0) are the same as fol-
lowing (D0, q
i
0). Step 4 shows choice probabilities following (A0, p0) are a weighted sum of choice proba-
bilities following (Â0, p
i
0), with weights given by µ0(s
i
0|C0(p0, A0)). Combined with the static represen-









Step 1: Static random expected utility representations. Since each Xt (t = 0, 1) is
a separable metric space (Lemma 12), Axiom 3 (History-dependent REU) together with Theo-
rem 0 yields a static REU representation (Ω0,F∗0 , µ0,F0, U0,W0) of ρ0 and for each h0 ∈ H0, a












1 ) of ρ1(·|h0). Thus far, there is no rela-
tionship between the period-0 and period-1 representations. In the following, we use Axioms 1,
2, and 4 to combine them into a DREU representation, which requires ρ1(p1, A1|A0, p0) to be
represented as a conditional probability, with respect to a single underlying probability space
Ω, of the event C(p1, A1) given the event C(p0, A0).
Step 2: Period-1 choices conditional on period-0 states. Let S0 be the finite partition
of Ω0 that generates F0. We refer to cells s0 ∈ S0 as states and let Us0 = U0(ω) for any
ω ∈ s0 ∈ S0. For any history (A0, p0), define U0(A0, p0) := {Us0 : s0 ∈ S0 and p0 ∈M(A0, Us0)}
to be the set of period-0 utilities consistent with the choice of p0 from A0. Since (U0,F0) is
simple, each Us0 is nonconstant and induces a different preference, so by standard arguments
(Lemma 13 in the appendix) we can find a menu D0 = {qs00 : s0 ∈ S0} that strictly separates
all states, i.e., such that for any s∗0 ∈ S0 we have U0(D0, q
s∗0
0 ) = {Us∗0}. Figure 2 shows an
example. For the remainder of this proof sketch, fix such a separating menu D0 and define
ρs01 (p1, A1) := ρ1(p1, A1|D0, qs00 ) for each A1 and p1. The representation of ρ1(·|D0, qs00 ) obtained
in Step 1 then constitutes a static REU representation (Ωs01 ,F∗s01 , µs01 ,F s01 , U s01 ,W s01 ) of ρs01 .
Step 3: ρs01 is well-defined. We now use Linear History Independence, Contraction
History Independence, and History Continuity to show that for any (B0, q0) ∈ H0 such that
U0(B0, q0) = {Us0}, we have ρ1(·, A1|B0, q0) = ρs01 (·, A1); that is, ρs01 describes choice behavior af-
ter any history that is only consistent with state s0. To see this, assume first that M(B0, Us0) =
20
{q0}, i.e., q0 is the unique maximizer of Us0 in B0. Define r0 := 12q0 +
1
2










{q0} + 12D0. Then U(B̃0, r0) = U(B̃0 ∪ D̃0, r0) = U(D̃0, r0) = {Us0}. From the
static REU representation of ρ0 and because M(B0, Us0) = {q0}, it follows that
ρ0(r0, B̃0) = ρ0(r0, B̃0 ∪ D̃0) = ρ0(r0, D̃0) = µ0(s0). (5)
But then
ρ1(·, A1|B0, q0) = ρ1(·, A1|B̃0, r0) = ρ1(·, A1|B̃0 ∪ D̃0, r0)
= ρ1(·, A1|D̃0, r0) = ρ1(·, A1|D0, qs00 ) = ρs01 (·, A1),
where the first and fourth equalities follow from Axiom 2 (Linear History Independence), the
second and third equalities from Axiom 1 (Contraction History Independence) and (5), and the
final equality holds by definition. Finally, using Axiom 4 (History Continuity), we can extend
this argument to the case where in state s0, q0 is tied with other lotteries in B0.
Step 4: Splitting histories into states. Now consider a general history h0 = (A0, p0).
By mixing with the separating menu D0, we can decompose ρ1(·|h0) into a weighted sum of
choice probabilities conditional on each state s0, where the weight on s0 is the µ0-conditional
probability of s0 given history h













qs00 . This is depicted in Figure 2. Note that by construction of D0 and the
representation of ρ0, we have that ρ0(p
s0
0 , Â0) = µ0(C0(p0, A0)|s0)µ0(s0), where C0(p0, A0) is the
event in Ω0 that p0 is chosen from A0. Moreover, whenever ρ0(p
s0
0 , Â0) > 0, then U0(Â0, ps00 ) =
{Us0}, so Step 3 together with the representation of ρs01 implies ρ1(p1, A1|Â0, ps00 ) = ρs01 (p1, A1) =
µ1(C
s0
1 (p1, A1)), where C
s0
1 (p1, A1) is the event in Ω
s0
1 that p1 is chosen from A1. Then































1 (p1, A1))µ0(s0|C0(p0, A0)).
(6)
Indeed, the first equality follows from Linear History Independence, the second equality from
the definition of ρ1 conditional on a set of histories, the third from the observations of the
preceding paragraph, and the fourth from Bayes’ rule.




1 . In the natural way, the




1 induce a finitely generated filtration on Ω, and the random
utilities and tie-breakers on Ω0 and Ω
s0
1 induce processes of utilities and tiebreakers on Ω.
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26Specifically, let F0 be generated by the partition {s0 × Ωs01 : s0 ∈ S0} and F1 by the partition {s0 ×
s1 : s0 ∈ S0, s1 ∈ Ss01 }. For any (ω0, ω1) ∈ s0 × Ω
s0
1 , let U0(ω0, ω1) = U0(ω0), U1(ω0, ω1) = U
s0
1 (ω1) and




Define µ on Ω by µ(E0×E1) = µ0(E0)× µs01 (E1) for any measurable E0 ⊆ s0, E1 ⊆ Ωs01 . From
the construction of Ω and (6), it is then easy to see that ρ1(p1, A1|h0) = µ(C(p1, A1)|C(p0, A0)),
where C(pt, At) denotes the event in Ω that pt is chosen from At. Thus, ρ admits a DREU
representation, as required.
4 Evolving Utility vs. Gradual Learning
4.1 History-dependent revealed preference
In the following subsections, we characterize evolving utility and gradual learning. Both models
impose additional restrictions on the agent’s realized utilities Ut(ω). However, in our setting, the
link between the agent’s stochastic and history-dependent choice behavior and her underlying
state-dependent utilities is less straightforward than under deterministic choice.27 To make this
link, we identify a collection of incomplete and history-dependent revealed preference relations.
For each history ht and any qt, rt ∈ ∆(Xt), qt %ht rt reveals that the agent prefers qt to rt
in any state of the world ω that gives rise to history ht; that is, Ut(ω)(qt) ≥ Ut(ω)(rt) for all
ω ∈ C(ht).













{q0, r0}) = 0. (7)
Then U0(ω)(q0) ≥ U0(ω)(r0) for all ω ∈ C(h0). Indeed, for an expected-utility maximizer, it is











{q0, r0} if and only if it is optimal to choose p0
from A0 and to choose r0 from {q0, r0}.28 Thus, if 12p0+
1
2







this reveals that the agent prefers q0 to r0 whenever she would select p0 from A0. Conversely,
if U0(ω)(q0) ≥ U0(ω)(r0) for all ω ∈ C(h0), then (7) continues to hold as long as q0 and r0 are
perturbed appropriately to eliminate potential ties.
More generally, this suggests the following definition:
Definition 5. For each t ≤ T − 1 and ht = (ht−1, At, pt) ∈ Ht relation %ht on ∆(Xt) is defined














{qnt , rnt }|ht−1) = 0 for all n.
27It is also less straightforward than in the dynamic logit model characterized by Fudenberg and Strzalecki
(2015) where (because of the i.i.d. nature of shocks) the deterministic component of the agent’s utility function
is identified, as under static logit, by choice with probability greater than a half.
28This observation is related to a common preference elicitation method in experimental work. To elicit a
subject’s ranking over a number of options in an incentive compatible manner, the subject is asked to indicate
choices from multiple menus; a lottery then determines which menu (and corresponding choice) is implemented.
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Let ∼ht and ht respectively denote the symmetric and asymmetric component of %ht .29
We show in Appendix C that when ρ admits a DREU representation, then qt %ht rt if and
only if Ut(ω)(qt) ≥ Ut(ω)(rt) for all ω ∈ C(ht).30 Thus, %ht captures the desired notion of
revealed preference.
4.2 Evolving Utility
To characterize evolving utility, the following three axioms employ %ht to translate conditions
from the deterministic menu-choice literature to our setting. First, Separability (e.g., Fishburn
1970, Theorem 11.1) ensures that utility in every state of the world has an additively separable
form Ut(zt, At+1) = ut(zt) + Vt(At+1):
Axiom 5 (Separability). For all t ≤ T − 1, ht, zt, xt and At+1, Bt+1, we have 12(zt, At+1) +
1
2




The next axiom translates conditions from Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) that en-
sure that Vt(At+1) captures the option value contained in menu At+1, i.e., that Vt(At+1) =
E[maxpt+1∈At+1 Ût+1(pt+1) | Ft] for some random utility function Ût+1. Part (i) is Kreps’s (1979)
preference for flexibility axiom; it says that the agent always weakly prefers bigger menus. Part
(ii) ensures that the agent cannot affect the filtration. Part (iii) ensures that %ht is continuous
and part (iv) that it induces a nontrivial preference over continuation menus.31
Axiom 6 (DLR Menu Preference). For all t ≤ T − 1 and ht, the following hold:32
(i). Monotonicity: For any zt and At+1 ⊆ Bt+1, we have (zt, Bt+1) %ht (zt, At+1).
(ii). Indifference to Timing: For any zt, At+1, Bt+1, and α ∈ (0, 1), we have (zt, αAt+1 + (1 −
α)Bt+1) ∼ht α(zt, At+1) + (1− α)(zt, Bt+1).
(iii). Continuity: %ht is continuous.33
(iv). Menu Nondegeneracy: There exist Bt+1, At+1 such that (zt, Bt+1) ht (zt, At+1) for all zt.
29That is, qt ∼ht rt if qt %ht rt and rt %ht qt. And qt ht rt if qt %ht rt and rt 6%ht qt.
30The “if” direction also makes use of Axioms 5 and 6 below. See Corollary C.1.
31%ht also satisfies a version of the DLR finiteness axiom (Axiom DLR 6 in Ahn and Sarver 2013). However,
in the presence of Sophistication, this property is inherited from the finiteness axiom on ρ (Axiom 3 (v)), so we
do not need to impose it as a separate condition.
32In the following, we identify any (zt, At+1) ∈ Xt with the Dirac lottery δ(zt,At+1) ∈ ∆(Xt).
33That is, for all pt ∈ ∆(Xt), the upper and lower contour sets {qt : qt %ht pt} and {qt : pt %ht qt} are closed
in ∆(Xt) endowed with the topology of weak convergence (recall that by by Lemma 12, Xt is a separable metric
space). Alternatively, it is enough to require that, for any zt and At+1, both {Bt+1 : (zt, At+1) %ht (zt, Bt+1)}
and {Bt+1 : (zt, Bt+1) %ht (zt, At+1)} are closed in At+1.
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The final axiom adapts the sophistication axiom due to Ahn and Sarver (2013). We require
that at any history ht, the agent values a menu Bt+1 strictly more than its subset At+1 if and
only if she in fact chooses something from Bt+1rAt+1 with strictly positive probability following
ht. This axiom ensures that the agent correctly anticipates her future utility distribution, that
is, Ût+1 = Ut+1.
Axiom 7 (Sophistication). For all t ≤ T − 1, ht ∈ Ht, and At+1 ⊆ Bt+1 ∈ A∗t+1(ht), the
following are equivalent:
(i). ρt+1(pt+1;Bt+1|ht) > 0 for some pt+1 ∈ Bt+1 r At+1
(ii). (zt, Bt+1) ht (zt, At+1) for all zt.
Theorem 2. Suppose that ρ admits a DREU representation. The following are equivalent:
(i). ρ satisfies Axioms 5–7.
(ii). ρ admits an evolving utility representation.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
4.3 Gradual Learning
Gradual learning is a specialization of evolving utility where the agent’s consumption preference
is time-invariant but unknown to her and she is learning about it over time. The additional
behavioral content of this assumption is captured by restrictions on the agent’s preference %ht
over streams of consumption lotteries.
Fix t ≤ T − 1. Given a sequence `t, . . . , `T ∈ ∆(Z) of consumption lotteries, let the stream
(`t, . . . , `T ) ∈ ∆(Xt) be the period-t lottery that at every period τ ≥ t yields consumption
according to `τ . Formally, for any consumption lottery ` ∈ ∆(Z) and menu At+1 ∈ At+1,
define (`, At+1) ∈ ∆(Xt) to be the period-t lottery that yields current consumption according
to ` and yields continuation menu At+1 for sure; i.e., (`, At+1) :=
∑
zt∈Z `(zt)δ(zt,At+1). Then
(`t, . . . , `T ) := (`t, At+1) ∈ ∆(Xt), where the sequence of menus At+1, . . . , AT is defined recur-
sively from period T backwards by AT := {`T} ∈ AT and As := {(`s, As+1)} ∈ As for all
s = t+ 1, . . . , T − 1. We write (`t, . . . , `τ ,m, . . . ,m) if `τ+1 = . . . = `T = m for some m ∈ ∆(Z)
and τ ≥ t, and we do not specify the number of m-entries when there is no risk of confusion.
The key axiom capturing learning is the following:
Axiom 8 (Stationary Consumption Preference). For all t ≤ T − 1, `,m, n ∈ ∆(Z), and ht,
(`, n, . . . , n) ht (m,n, . . . , n) if and only if (n, `, n, . . . , n) ht (n,m, n, . . . , n).
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Axiom 8 implies that at any history ht, the agent’s felicity today and her expected felic-
ity tomorrow induce the same preference over consumption lotteries. The following example
illustrates the connection with learning.
Example 4. Suppose the agent faces a choice between two providers of some service, e.g.,
two hairdressers or dentists. Based on her current information, she believes provider ` to be
better than m (n denotes no consumption), so will select the former if choosing between walk-
in appointments today. If her desired appointment date is next week, then the agent may in
general prefer to delay her decision, because she may be able to acquire more information in the
meantime. However, Axiom 8 says that if she is forced to decide today (say, because advance
booking is required), then she must again prefer to commit to `. This is because if the agent
currently believes ` to be better than m, then by the martingale property of beliefs she should
expect her information next week to still favor ` on average. N
Given Axiom 8, the agent’s felicity today and her expected felicity tomorrow can be normal-
ized to be the same. The next axiom ensures that the agent’s time preference is deterministic
and time-invariant. Suppose that for some consumption lotteries ` and m there is a weight α
that makes the agent indifferent between getting (` today and m tomorrow) and the lottery
α` + (1 − α)m in both periods. Provided the agent is not indifferent between ` and m today,
this weight together with the fact that today’s felicity equals tomorrow’s expected felicity iden-
tifies the agent’s discount factor. The axiom asserts that this weight, and hence the agent’s
discount factor, is independent of today’s state and time period. We say that `,m ∈ ∆(Z) are
ht-nonindifferent if (`, n, . . . , n) 6∼ht (m,n, . . . , n) for some n ∈ ∆(Z).
Axiom 9 (Constant Intertemporal Tradeoff). For all t, τ ≤ T − 1, if `,m are ht-nonindifferent
and ˆ̀, m̂ are gτ -nonindifferent, then for all α ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ ∆Z:
(`,m, n, . . . , n) ∼ht (α`+ (1− α)m,α`+ (1− α)m,n, . . . , n)
⇐⇒
(ˆ̀, m̂, n, . . . , n) ∼gτ (α ˆ̀+ (1− α)m̂, α ˆ̀+ (1− α)m̂, n, . . . , n).
Axiom 9 has no bite if the agent is indifferent between all consumption lotteries at ht. To
rule this out, we impose the following condition:
Condition 1 (Consumption Nondegeneracy). For all t ≤ T − 1 and ht, there exist ht-
nonindifferent `,m ∈ ∆(Z).
Theorem 3. Suppose that ρ admits an evolving utility representation and Condition 1 is
satisfied. The following are equivalent:
(i). ρ satisfies Axioms 8 and 9.
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(ii). ρ admits a gradual learning representation.
The proof is in Appendix D. The argument for sufficiency proceeds in three steps. Consider
an evolving utility representation (Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, Ut,Wt, ut)) of ρ, where we can perform appro-
priate normalizations to ensure that
∑
z∈Z ut(ω)(z) = 0 for all ω and t and that the discount
factor is 1. Fix any ω and t ≤ T − 1. We first show that Axiom 8 implies that ut(ω) and
ût(ω) := E[ut+1 | Ft(ω)] represent the same preference over consumption lotteries. Thus, there
exists a (possibly state and time-dependent) δt(ω) such that ût(ω) = δt(ω)ut(ω). Next, note
that if ut(ω)(`) 6= ut(ω)(m), then the unique weight α that makes the agent indifferent between
(` today and m tomorrow) and (α`+(1−α)m both today and tomorrow) is 1
1+δt(ω)
. Hence, Ax-
iom 9 together with Condition 1 implies that δt(ω) ≡ δ > 0 is state and time-invariant. Finally,
the above shows that the process (δ−tut) is a martingale, so that δ
−tut(ω) = E[δ−TuT | Ft(ω)].
Thus, replacing Ut with δ
−tUt and ut with δ
−tut yields a gradual learning representation of ρ,
where ũ = E[δ−TUT | FT ]. Finally, we note that δ will be strictly less than 1 if and only if ρ
additionally satisfies the following impatience axiom: for all t ≤ T − 1, ht, and `,m, n ∈ ∆(Z),
if (`, n, . . . , n) ht (m,n . . . , n), then (`,m, n, . . . , n) ht (m, `, n . . . , n).
A natural generalization of gradual learning is to replace the discount factor δ in (2) with
a random variable δ : Ω→ R++ that is measurable with respect to time 0 private information
F0. This captures the idea of a population of agents with heterogeneous discount factors,
each of whom is learning over time about their fixed but unknown felicity. An analogous
characterization can be obtained in this case: The only difference is that instead of imposing
Axiom 9 on arbitrary histories ht and gτ , we require that ht be a subhistory of gτ .
5 Properties of the Representations
5.1 Uniqueness
The following proposition, which we prove in Supplementary Appendix H, summarizes the
uniqueness properties of DREU, evolving utility, and gradual learning.
Proposition 1. Suppose ρ and ρ̂ admit DREU representations D = (Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, Ut,Wt))
and D̂ = (Ω̂, F̂∗, µ̂, (F̂t, Ût, Ŵt)), with partitions Πt and Π̂t generating Ft and F̂t, respectively.
Then ρ = ρ̂ if and only if for each t there exists a bijection φt : Πt → Π̂t and Ft-measurable
functions αt : Ω→ R++ and βt : Ω→ R such that for all ω ∈ Ω:
(i). µ(F0(ω)) = µ̂(φ0(F0(ω))) and µ(Ft(ω)|Ft−1(ω)) = µ̂(φt(Ft(ω))|φt−1(Ft−1(ω))) if t ≥ 1;
(ii). Ut(ω) = αt(ω)Ût(ω̂) + βt(ω) whenever ω̂ ∈ φt(Ft(ω));
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(iii). µ[{Wt ∈ Bt(ω)}|Ft(ω)] = µ̂[{Ŵt ∈ Bt(ω)}|φt(Ft(ω))] for any Bt(ω) such that Bt(ω) =
{w ∈ RX : pt ∈M(M(At, Ut(ω)), w)} for some pt ∈ At ∈ At.
If (D, (ut), δ) is an evolving utility representation of ρ, then (D̂, (ût), δ̂) is an evolving utility
representation of ρ if and only if (i)-(iii) hold and additionally
(iv). αt(ω) = α0(ω)(
δ̂
δ
)t for all ω ∈ Ω and t = 0, . . . , T ;
(v). ut(ω) = αt(ω)ût(ω̂) + γt(ω) whenever ω̂ ∈ φt(Ft(ω)), where γT (ω) := βT (ω) and γt(ω) :=
βt(ω)− δE[βt+1|Ft(ω)] if t ≤ T − 1.
If (D, (ut), δ) is a gradual learning representation of ρ that satisfies Condition 1, then (D̂, (ût), δ̂)
is a gradual learning representation of ρ if and only if (i)-(v) hold and additionally
(vi). δ = δ̂
(vii). βt(ω) =
1−δT−t+1
1−δ E[βT |Ft(ω)] for all ω and t.
Points (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 show that in DREU, the agent’s choices uniquely de-
termine her underlying stochastic process of ordinal payoff-relevant private information, while
point (iii) shows that the (ordinal) distribution of tie-breakers is pinned down for choices fea-
turing ties. This is the period-by-period dynamic analog of known identification results for
static REU representations (Proposition 4 in Ahn and Sarver (2013)). Intuitively, applying a
different positive affine transformation of the vNM utility in each state does not change the op-
timal choice, and likewise a measure-preserving relabeling of states does not change the choice
distribution.
Point (iv) shows that evolving utility implies strictly sharper identification than DREU of the
agent’s cardinal private information: In particular, the random scaling factor used to transform
δ̂tÛt into δ
tUt is given by α0(ω), and hence is the same in all periods and measurable with
respect to period-0 private information. This allows for meaningful intertemporal comparisons
such as “in state ω, the additional period-t utility for pt over qt is greater than the additional
discounted period-(t + 1) utility for pt+1 over qt+1” and cross-state comparisons such as “the
additional period-t utility for pt over qt is greater in state ω than in state ω
′ ∈ F0(ω).”34 In
the heterogeneous population interpretation, this means that behavior doesn’t change upon
multiplying the felicity of a particular agent-type by the same positive number in each period.
These numbers can differ across types, except for types that share the same period 0 private
information. Thus, the model allows for general intrapersonal intertemporal comparisons of
utility, but only for limited interpersonal comparisons. This generalizes the main identification
34The reason the discount factor is not identified in this model is similar to the lack of identification of
subjective probability when utility is state dependent: multiplying δ by λ > 0 and dividing ut by λ leads to the
same preferences and hence choice probabilities.
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result (Theorem 2) in Ahn and Sarver (2013): In a two-period setting without consumption in
period 0, they obtain U1(ω) = αÛ1(ω̂) + β1(ω), where α is constant since they do not allow for
period-0 private information.
Finally, gradual learning, unlike evolving utility, allows for unique identification of the dis-
count factor (point (vi)) and entails even sharper identification of cardinal private information
(point (vii)).35
5.2 Choice and Taste Persistence
As discussed in Example 1, consumption persistence is a widely documented phenomenon, for
instance in the marketing literature on brand choice and history dependence is one of its possible
explanations. This section introduces two formalizations of this notion and characterizes the
corresponding felicity processes ut in the evolving utility representation.
Our first notion of consumption persistence captures the idea that (absent ties) the agent
is more likely to choose consumption lottery p today if she chose p yesterday than if she chose
q yesterday, provided today’s menu does not include any new consumption options relative to
yesterday’s menu. To state this formally we focus on atemporal menus, i.e., menus that do
not feature any intertemporal tradeoffs, so that the agent’s choices are governed solely by her
preference over current consumption. Formally, for t ≤ T − 1 menu At is atemporal if for any
pt, qt ∈ At, we have pAt = qAt . We write AZt := {pZt : pt ∈ At} ⊆ ∆(Z). All period T menus AT
are atemporal with AZT = AT .
Definition 6. ρ features consumption persistence if for any histories ht = (ht−1, At, pt), g
t =
(ht−1, At, qt) and pt+1 ∈ At+1 ∈ A∗t+1(ht) ∩ A∗t+1(gt) with At and At+1 atemporal, AZt+1 ⊆ AZt ,
and pZt = p
Z
t+1, we have ρt+1(pt+1;At+1|ht−1, At, pt) ≥ ρt+1(pt+1;At+1|ht−1, At, qt).
To obtain a characterization of consumption persistence, we impose the assumption that
there are two consumption lotteries ` and ` that are ranked the same way at all histories. This
condition is innocuous if, for example, the outcome space includes a monetary dimension.
Condition 2 (Uniformly Ranked Pair). There exist `, ` ∈ ∆(Z) such that for all t, ht, and
m ∈ ∆(Z), we have (`,m, . . . ,m) ht (`,m, . . . ,m).
If ρ admits an evolving utility representation, consumption persistence is equivalent to a
particular form of taste persistence: for any felicity u and any convex set D containing u,
today’s felicity is more likely to be (equivalent to) a felicity in D if yesterday’s felicity was u
than if yesterday’s felicity was any other u′. Formally, given any set D ⊆ RZ of felicities, let
[D] := {w ∈ RZ : w ≈ v for some v ∈ D}.
35 The discount factor is unique in other special cases of evolving utility, for example if each alternative z
consists of wealth and a consumption bundle and the utility of wealth is separable and state-independent.
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Proposition 2. Suppose ρ admits an evolving utility representation (Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, Ut,Wt, ut))
and Condition 2 holds. Then the following are equivalent:
(i). ρ features consumption persistence
(ii). for any u, u′ ∈ RZ , convex D ⊆ RZ with u ∈ D, and ht−1 with µ({ut ≈ u}|C(ht−1)),
µ({ut ≈ u′}|C(ht−1)) > 0, we have
µ({ut+1 ∈ [D]}|C(ht−1) ∩ {ut ≈ u}) ≥ µ({ut+1 ∈ [D]}|C(ht−1) ∩ {ut ≈ u′}).
Proof. See Supplementary Appendix I. 
An alternative notion, which is neither implied by nor implies consumption persistence,
is consumption inertia. This says that if an agent chose a particular consumption lottery
yesterday, then (absent ties) she will continue to choose it with positive probability today, as
long as today’s menu does not include any new consumption options.
Definition 7. ρ features consumption inertia if for any ht = (ht−1, At, pt) ∈ Ht and pt+1 ∈
At+1 ∈ A∗t+1(ht) with At and At+1 atemporal, AZt+1 ⊆ AZt , and pZt = pZt+1, we have
ρt(pt+1;At+1|ht−1, At, pt) > 0.
In the presence of Condition 1 (Consumption Nondegeneracy) from Section 4.3, consumption
inertia is equivalent to an alternative notion of taste persistence which requires that if the agent’s
period t consumption preference is given by u, her period t+1 consumption preference remains
u with positive probability.
Proposition 3. Suppose that ρ admits an evolving utility representation
(Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, Ut,Wt, ut)) and Condition 1 is satisfied. Then the following are equivalent:
(i). ρ features consumption inertia
(ii). for any u ∈ RZ and ht−1 with µ({ut ≈ u}|C(ht−1)) > 0, we have
µ({ut+1 ≈ u}|C(ht−1) ∩ {ut ≈ u}) > 0.
Proof. See Supplementary Appendix I. 
The next section illustrates the different implications of the two notions by considering an
evolving utility representation in which the felicity ut follows a finite Markov chain.
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5.2.1 Application: Markov Chain
Let U = {u1, ..., um} denote a finite set of possible felicities, where ui 6≈ uj for any i 6= j and
there exist `, ` ∈ ∆(Z) such that ui((`)) > ui(`) for all i. Let M be an irreducible transition
matrix, where Mij denotes the probability that period t+ 1 utility is u
j conditional on period t
utility being ui. The initial distribution ξ is assumed to have full support, but need not be the
stationary distribution. Any such Markov chain (U ,M, ξ) generates a Markov evolving utility
representation.
Corollary 1. Suppose that ρ has a Markov evolving utility representation (U ,M, ξ).
(i). Assume that for any i, j, k, l with i /∈ {j, k, l}, we have ui 6∈ [co{uj, uk, ul}]. Then ρ
features consumption persistence if and only if the Markov chain is a renewal process,
i.e., there exists α ∈ [0, 1) and ν ∈ ∆(U) such that Mii = α + (1 − α)ν(ui) and Mij =
(1− α)ν(uj) for all i 6= j.
(ii). ρ features consumption inertia if and only if Mii > 0 for every i.
Proof. See Supplementary Appendix I. 
The assumption that ui 6∈ [co{uj, uk, ul}] in point (i) is a regularity condition on the struc-
ture of U that is generically satisfied if the outcome space is rich enough relative to the number of
utility functions. The following example does not satisfy the condition. It features consumption
persistence under a non-renewal process.
Example 5 (Random walk over a line). Consider an evolving utility representation where the
felicity process is of the form ut = w+α(xt)v, where w, v ∈ RZ are fixed felicities, α : Z→ R is a
strictly increasing function, and xt follows a random walk over Z: it remains at its current value
with probability p, increases by one with probability 1−p
2
, and decreases by one with probability
1−p
2
. This agent displays consumption persistence if and only if p ≥ 1
3
and consumption inertia
if and only if p > 0. N
6 Comparison with Dynamic Discrete Choice
In this section, we relate our analysis to the dynamic discrete choice (DDC) literature. Sec-
tion 6.1 demonstrates that the i.i.d. DDC model that is very widely used in this literature
is incompatible with evolving utility, because it violates a key feature of Bayesian rationality,
positive option value. Section 6.2 shows that by utilizing menu variation, our analysis yields
identification results that are complementary to those in the DDC literature.
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6.1 Evolving Utility vs. i.i.d. DDC
Parametric specifications of our evolving utility model are featured in the DDC literature (e.g.
Pakes, 1986). By far more widely used, however, is the i.i.d. DDC model, which is the following
alternative special case of DREU, see e.g., Miller (1984), Rust (1989), Hendel and Nevo (2006),
Kennan and Walker (2011), Sweeting (2013), and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012). The
DDC literature typically defines choices only on deterministic decision trees; in what follows
we study this restriction of our domain. Let YT := Z and AdT := K(YT ) and recursively for
t ≤ T − 1 define Yt := Z ×Adt+1 and Adt := K(Yt).36
Definition 8. The i.i.d. DDC model is a restriction of DREU to deterministic decision trees
that additionally satisfies the Bellman equation









where the functions vt : Z → R are deterministic; the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1); and εt : Ω→ RYt




τ are independently and
identically distributed nondegenerate random variables for all (zt, At+1) and (xτ , Bτ+1).
In the i.i.d. DDC model, utilities Ut(zt, At+1) feature a deterministic component that is





; to generate randomness, the model adds on a shock ε
(zt,At+1)
t
whose distribution is i.i.d. across time and across options (zt, At+1). Clearly, the i.i.d. DDC
model is not equivalent to evolving utility, because unlike the latter it does not allow for
serially correlated utilities and hence does not give rise to history dependent choice behavior.
More strongly, however, we now show that the models are in fact incompatible: While evolving
utility entails a positive option value, the i.i.d. DDC model has the opposite implication.
A first manifestation of this difference is that the i.i.d. DDC agent sometimes chooses to
commit to strictly smaller menus. Let At := {(zt, At+1), (zt, Bt+1)} where At+1 ( Bt+1. From
Axiom 6 it follows that in the evolving utility model, absent ties, ρt ((zt, At+1), At|ht) = 0.
By contrast, in the i.i.d. DDC model, (8) implies that as long as the distribution of ε-
shocks has large enough support,37 the agent will choose (zt, At+1) from At with strictly
positive probability; in particular, this happens whenever the realization of ε
(zt,At+1)
t exceeds
36Alternatively, we could study an extension of the DDC model to lotteries. One natural candidate is a linear
extension, under which the DDC model is a special case of DREU. Other extensions to lotteries are possible, but
they are less satisfactory, as they violate Axiom 0 and lead to counterintuitive comparative statics as pointed
out in the static setting by Apesteguia and Ballester (2017). Our results in this section are independent of the
extension since they hold on the subdomain Adt .
37Indeed, the DDC literature typically assumes this distribution to have full support. On deterministic




t by more than the expected utility difference of the two menus. Nevertheless, since
E[Ut+1(zt, Bt+1)] ≥ E[Ut+1(zt, At+1)], the probability that the i.i.d. DDC agent chooses (zt, At+1)
is less than 0.5.
More strikingly, there are decision problems for which the i.i.d. DDC agent’s behavior dis-
plays a negative option value with probability greater than 0.5. Specifically, consider the
















Figure 3: Decision Timing.
three periods t = 0, 1, 2. The consumption in period 2 is either y or z, depending on the
decision of the agent. The agent can make her decision early, committing in period 1 to
receiving y or z the following period; or she can make the decision late, maintaining full flex-
ibility about choosing y or z until the final period. The decision when to choose is made
in period 0, and the consumption in periods 0 and 1 is x irrespective of the decision of the
agent; for simplicity assume that the utility of x is always zero.38 Formally, in period 0 the
agent faces the menu A0 = {(x,Aearly1 ), (x,Alate1 )} and in period 1 she faces either the menu
Aearly1 = {(x, {y}), (x, {z})} or the menu Alate1 = {(x, {y, z})}, depending on her period-0 choice.
Note that the agent’s decision when to choose does not change the time at which consump-
tions y or z are received, nor does it affect her consumption in periods 0 or 1, so that there is no
penalty to making the decision late. In accordance with positive option value, in the evolving
utility model the agent thus chooses to make decisions late with probability 1 (absent ties),
because waiting an extra period gives her more information, which enables her to better tailor
38Under i.i.d. DDC this means that vt(x) = 0 for all t; under evolving utility that µ({ut(x) = 0}) = 1. Clearly
Proposition 4 does not rely on this normalization.
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her choice to the state.39 To see this, note that
U0(x,A
early
1 ) = E[max{E[u2(y)|F1],E[u2(z)|F1]}|F0]
U0(x,A
late
1 ) = E[E[max{u2(y), u2(z)}|F1]|F0].
By the conditional Jensen inequality and convexity of the max operator, the agent always
weakly prefers to decide late. Moreover, this preference is strict at ω as long as there exist
ω′, ω′′ ∈ F0(ω) with F1(ω′) = F1(ω′′) such that u2(y)− u2(z) changes sign on {ω′, ω′′}.
This preference for late decisions does not hold in the i.i.d. DDC model, where we have
U0(x,A
early
1 ) = ε
(x,Aearly1 )








1 ) = ε
(x,Alate1 )





The simplest case to analyze is when v2(y) = v2(z): In this case, the comparison of
the continuation values boils down to the comparison between δE[max{ε(x,{y})1 , ε
(x,{z})
1 }] and
δ2E[max{εy2, εz2}]. Since the ε shocks are i.i.d. and mean zero and δ ∈ (0, 1), the former domi-
nates the latter, so that the agent chooses to decide early with probability greater than 0.5. The
option of choosing early is attractive because it allows the agent to obtain a positive payoff,
namely the maximum of two i.i.d. mean zero shocks, early while deferring the choice delays
those payoffs. Proposition 4, which we prove in Supplementary Appendix J, shows that this
conclusion holds for any values of v2(y) and v2(z).
Proposition 4. In the i.i.d. DDC model ρ0((x,A
early
1 ), A0) ≥ 0.5.
A special case of this result for logit ε shocks was proved by Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015),
by examining the closed-form expressions for continuation values in this setting.40 Proposition 4
shows that this result does not rely on those specific expressions. Rather, it is a consequence of
the mechanical nature of ε shocks in any i.i.d. DDC model, in particular the fact that shocks
to continuation menus are completely detached from their expected continuation value.41
Under evolving utility the amount of randomness in choices from menus
{(zt, At+1), (zt, Bt+1)} is determined by the randomness in continuation values
39A related finding is Theorem 2 of Krishna and Sadowski (2016), who show that one agent prefers to commit
to a constant consumption plan more than another agent if and only if her utility process is more autocorrelated,
in other words, when she expects to learn less in the future.
40Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) also introduced a choice-aversion parameter that scales the desire for
flexibility and for early decisions. However, in this model the parameter values that imply choice of late
decisions with probability higher than 0.5 also imply choice of smaller menus with probability higher than 0.5,
thus making violations of positive option value particularly stark in the latter dimension.
41Our critique of the mechanical nature of ε shocks is complementary to Apesteguia and Ballester’s (2017)
critique in the static setting, but the logic of our result is quite different, both formally and conceptually. In
particular, in Proposition 4 these mechanical shocks lead to counterintuitive predictions at an absolute level,
rather than at a comparative level as in their results.
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E[maxyt+1∈At+1 Ut+1(yt+1) | Ft]; in other words, by how much of the uncertainty about
payoffs in t+ 1 is resolved in period t: the more the agent learns in period t, the more random
her choices. Thus, the randomness of choices in this model is a reflection of the agent’s
learning about fundamentals. By contrast, under i.i.d. DDC, the shocks ε
(zt,At+1)
t are i.i.d.
across continuation menus, so that randomness here is unrelated to the agent’s expectation of





see this, consider the modification of equation (8), where the shocks ε
(zt,At+1)
t are i.i.d. over







continuation menus At+1 and Bt+1. This model is a special case of evolving utility where the
utilities ut(zt) := vt(zt) + ε
zt
t are independent over time; reflecting the fact that no uncertainty
about payoffs in t+ 1 is resolved in period t, choices from the menu {(zt, At+1), (zt, Bt+1)} are
deterministic in this case (absent ties).
An advantage that sets the i.i.d. DDC model apart from evolving utility is its statistical
convenience: Since shocks do not depend on continuation values their computation does not
involve recursive calculations; moreover, by specifying shock distributions with sufficiently large
support it is easy to ensure non-degenerate likelihoods (i.e., that all options are chosen with
positive probability), whereas under evolving utility some options are necessarily chosen with
probability 0. However, as we have highlighted above, this convenience comes at a cost, namely
the violation of a key feature of Bayesian rationality, positive option value. Such misspecifica-
tions of option value seem particularly problematic in applications where the modeled agents
are profit-maximizing firms, and they may potentially lead to biased parameter estimates in
these settings.42 Conceptually, this casts doubt on the typical interpretation of ε as “unob-
served utility shocks.” Another interpretation of ε in the DDC literature is that they capture
“mistakes” or some small deviations from perfect rationality. However, Proposition 4 shows
that the implied deviations are not small as they occur with probability greater than a half;
moreover, this interpretation is at odds with the fact that in (8) the ε shocks enter into the
agent’s expected continuation value.
6.2 Identification
There is an extensive literature on identification of DDC models. That literature typically
features a state variable with two components: the first one is jointly observed by both the agent
and the analyst and the second one is private to the agent. Identification results mostly keep
the menu fixed in every period and exploit variation in the jointly observable state variables.43
42The quantitative importance of such biases is an empirical question, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
43For example, exclusion restrictions on terminal states and renewal states are often used (Magnac and
Thesmar, 2002); another related set of results is due to Norets and Tang (2013) who use exogenous variation in
the transition probabilities of observed variables.
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By contrast, our analysis has abstracted away from jointly observed state variables, but our
uniqueness results in Section 5.1 rely on the assumption that the analyst observes choices from
different menus.44 Identification results in static models sometimes do utilize menu variation
(e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995); however, we are not aware of similar results in the
dynamic setting. As a result, the two sets of results are mostly complementary. In the rest of
this section we highlight the most relevant points of contact, but an exhaustive comparison is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Manski (1993) and Rust (1994) show that in a DDC model it is not possible to distinguish
a myopic agent (δ = 0) from a patient agent (δ > 0). On the other hand, in the evolving
utility model these two cases can be distinguished based on menu variation. More generally,
the reasons why δ is not identified are different in the two models: δ is not identified in the
DDC model even under the assumption that the function v is time invariant because each
action is uniquely associated with a probability distribution over continuation menus and the
continuation value can be absorbed into v without changing behavior. On the other hand,
the reason δ is not pinned down under evolving utility has to do with time-dependence of the
function ut; see footnote 34. As Magnac and Thesmar (2002) show, the discount factor can be
identified in DDC models using additional assumptions on how the utility function depends on
the jointly observable variable. As we mentioned in Section 5.1, similar restrictions lead to the
identification of δ under evolving utility (see footnote 35). Moreover, another special case when
the discount factor can be identified is the gradual learning model.
Many of the results about the identification of the utility function v assume a known con-
ditionally independent distribution of ε, see e.g., Magnac and Thesmar (2002).45 Although the
per-period utilities are non-parametrically not identified, certain differences in value functions
are. Our approach partially identifies the distribution of u (up to positive affine transforma-
tions), which corresponds to jointly identifying v and the distribution of ε. This is similar to the
partial identification results of Norets and Tang (2013) who also relax the known distribution
of ε assumption; however, they maintain the conditional independence assumption, whereas our
uniqueness result holds also under any possible pattern of serial correlation.46
44More precisely, in the DDC literature the analyst may observe choices from different menus, but menus are
determined by the jointly observable variable which is also an argument of the utility function, preventing a
clean separation.
45Rust (1994) discusses identification of v in a deterministic choice model without unobservable shocks.
46Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) obtain identification results for finite mixtures of conditionally independent
DDC models and Hu and Shum (2012) generalize these result to other forms of serial correlation. However,
those papers only identify the mixing probabilities and the choice probabilities conditional on unobserved het-
erogeneity; they are not after the identification of structural parameters.
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7 Extension: Consumption Dependence
Our analysis thus far has focused on isolating a form of history dependence where choices in
period t depend on histories ht = (A0, p0, . . . , At−1, pt−1) of past choices purely due to the fact
that ht partially reveals the agent’s serially correlated private information. For this analysis the
sequence (z0, . . . , zt) of agent’s past consumptions was immaterial, because the fact that zk ∈
supp pZk was realized does not reveal any additional private information to the analyst. In many
settings, however, an additional channel through which the agent’s past choices can directly
affect her current choices is that her past consumption may change her current preferences.
Two prominent examples of this phenomenon, which we call consumption dependence, are
habit formation (e.g., Becker and Murphy, 1988), where consuming a certain good in the past
may make the agent like it more in the present; and active learning/experimentation, where
the agent’s consumption provides information to her about some payoff-relevant state of the
world, as modeled for instance by the multi-armed bandit literature (e.g., Gittins and Jones,
1972; Robbins, 1952).
The present section, in conjunction with Supplementary Appendix K which contains all
details, shows that our main insights extend to settings with consumption dependence. To this
end, we enrich our primitive: A history ht−1 = (A0, p0, z0, . . . , At−1, pt−1, zt−1) now summarizes
not only that at each period k ≤ t − 1 the agent faced menu Ak and chose pk, but also that
the agent’s realized consumption was zk ∈ supp pZk . Conditional on ht−1, the analyst observes
the frequency ρt(pt, At|ht−1) with which the agent chooses pt from any menu At such that
(zt−1, At) ∈ supp pt−1.
Theorem 5 in Appendix K shows that natural adaptations of Axioms 1–4 to this setting
are equivalent to ρ admitting a consumption-dependent DREU (CDREU) representation: At
each time t, the agent’s choices maximize her vNM utility Ust ∈ RXt , which is determined by a
subjective state st drawn from a finite state space St. There is an initial distribution µ0 ∈ ∆(S0),
and at each t, today’s state st and consumption zt jointly determine the distribution µ
st,zt
t+1 ∈
∆(St+1) over tomorrow’s states. The full formal specification of the representation, including
its tie-breaking rule, is in Appendix K. The adaptations of Axioms 1 and 2 still impose history
independence of ρt across histories h
t−1 and gt−1 that are contraction equivalent or linearly
equivalent. The sole difference is that in order for such ht−1 and gt−1 to reveal the same private
information, we now additionally require that they entail the same sequences (z0, . . . , zt−1) of
realized consumptions; otherwise ht−1 and gt−1 may correspond to different distributions of
subjective states due to the consumption dependence of the transition distributions µsk,zkk+1 .
As before, we also characterize two important special cases of CDREU that feature dynamic
sophistication. Consumption-dependent evolving utility requires Ust to be given by a Bellman
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equation of the form




Ust+1(pt+1) | st, zt
]
, (9)
where the expectation operator is with respect to the distribution µst,ztt+1 of states that will arise
after consuming zt. Theorem 6 shows that consumption-dependent evolving utility is obtained
from CDREU by additionally imposing analogs of the DLR Menu Preference and Sophistication
axioms used to characterize evolving utility. Unlike with evolving utility, (9) does not imply any
analog of Separability, as current consumption zt can influence preferences over continuation
menus At+1 through its effect on the distribution over tomorrow’s utilities Ust+1 . Consumption-
dependent evolving utility can accommodate a number of behavioral phenomena where past
consumption directly affects current utility. Example 6 below illustrates this for the case of habit
formation;47 related phenomena include preference for variety (e.g., McAlister, 1982; Rustichini
and Siconolfi, 2014), memorable consumption (Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Samuelson, 2016), and
endogenous discounting (e.g., Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Uzawa, 1968).48 In contrast with most
existing models of these phenomena, our formulation allows the effect of past consumption on
today’s utility to be stochastic—arguably a realistic feature in many contexts.
Example 6 (Habit formation). Suppose V ⊆ RZ is a finite set of felicities. There is an initial
distribution π0 ∈ ∆(V) and a map π : V ×Z → ∆(V), capturing the stochastic transition from
today’s felicity and consumption to tomorrow’s felicity. At each period t and current felicity
vt ∈ V , the agent maximizes






t+1 (pt+1) dπ(vt, zt)(vt+1)
for t ≤ T − 1 and U vTT (zT ) = vT (zT ). To illustrate how this representation can capture a
stochastic form of habit formation, suppose for simplicity that Z = {0, 1} and V = {v0, v1},
where v1(1) = v0(0) = 1 and v1(0) = v0(1) = 0, and let πijk := π(v
i, j)(vk) for i, j, k ∈ {0, 1}.
Then the agent displays habit formation if π111 > π101, π011 > π001, so that she is more likely
to prefer 1 to 0 today if she preferred 1 yesterday and/or consumed 1 yesterday. N






47Several papers have characterized versions of habit formation focusing on deterministic choice, e.g., Gul and
Pesendorfer (2007), Rozen (2010). To the best of our knowledge, the non-axiomatic work by Gilboa and Pazgal
(2001) is the only stochastic choice model.
48Higashi, Hyogo, and Takeoka (2014) characterize a stochastic version of endogenous discounting, but have
as their primitive deterministic ex-ante preferences over infinite-horizon decision problems.
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Capturing the fact that felicity is fixed but unknown to the agent who learns about it over time,
(10) requires that her expectation (prior to consuming any particular zt) of tomorrow’s felicity
equal today’s felicity (irrespective of the particular zt). Unlike with gradual learning, today’s
consumption zt can have an effect on tomorrow’s felicity by affecting tomorrow’s information;
but unlike with general consumption-dependent evolving utility, this effect is purely informa-
tional, and hence zt does not affect the agent’s expectation of tomorrow’s felicity. As with
gradual learning, this additional discipline allows unique identification of the discount factor.
Theorem 7 shows that active learning is obtained from consumption-dependent evolving utility
by additionally imposing analogs of Axioms 8 and 9 used to characterize gradual learning, as
well as a weak form of Separability. The latter requires that if from tomorrow on the agent is
committed to a particular stream of consumption lotteries (`t+1, . . . , `T ), then her preference
over today’s consumption zt does not depend on (`t+1, . . . , `T ). This captures the idea that
consumption lottery streams, unlike general continuation menus At+1, only entail degenerate
future choices; hence, today’s consumption does not have any informational value in this case,
so that the agent evaluates today’s consumption myopically, based solely on today’s felicity ust .
Example 7 below shows that active learning nests the standard independent multi-armed
bandit model, as well as models that allow for correlation of arms (e.g., Easley and Kiefer 1988,
Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Jullien 1991).49 (The active learning model is more general than
the one from Example 7 as it allows for very general signal structures, not necessarily i.i.d.
conditional on the state.)
Example 7 (Experimentation). Now period-t states correspond to period-t beliefs about a state
of the world θ ∈ Θ, which captures uncertainty about the true underlying felicity ũθ ∈ RZ .
There is a prior π0 ∈ ∆(Θ) and consuming any particular z produces a signal about Θ whose
distribution is i.i.d. over time conditional on z and θ. (This specification is general enough to
allow the agent to learn about the utility of item x from consuming item z; imposing a further
product structure on Θ leads to the usual independent bandit case.) The signal structure
induces a map π : ∆(Θ) × Z → ∆(∆(Θ)) from prior beliefs ν ∈ ∆(Θ) and consumptions z to
distributions π(ν, z) ∈ ∆(∆(Θ)) over posterior beliefs. At each period t and belief νt, the agent
maximizes
Uνtt (zt, At+1) =
∫






t+1 (pt+1) dπ(νt, zt)(νt+1)
for t ≤ T − 1 and UνtT (zT ) =
∫
ũθ(zt) dνT (θ). Note that by the martingale property
of beliefs we have ν =
∫
ν ′ dπ(ν, z)(ν ′) for all ν and z, so that uνtt :=
∫
ũθ dνt(θ) =∫ ∫
ũθ dνt+1(θ) dπ(νt, zt)(νt+1) =: E[uνt+1t+1 |νt, zt] for all νt, zt, as required by (10). N
49Hyogo (2007), Cooke (2016) and Piermont, Takeoka, and Teper (2016) axiomatize related models, taking
as their primitive deterministic ex ante preferences over decision problems.
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Finally, Heckman (1981) highlights the importance of distinguishing between (what we term)
history dependence and consumption dependence, so as to avoid spuriously attributing a causal
role to past consumption when observed behavior could instead be explained through serially
correlated private information, such as persistent taste heterogeneity. The following condition
allows us to make this distinction:
Axiom 10 (Consumption Independence). For all t ≤ T , if ht−1 =
(A0, p0, z0, . . . , At−1, pt−1, zt−1) and g
t−1 = (A0, p0, z
′




Consumption independence states that sequences (z0, . . . , zt−1) of realized consumptions are
in fact immaterial for observed choice behavior. When ρ admits a CDREU representation, it
is easy to see that it admits a DREU representation if and only if consumption independence
is satisfied.50 Thus, this condition captures precisely the observed choice behavior that can be
explained through serially correlated private information alone.
8 Discussion
8.1 Related Literature
An extensive literature studies axiomatic characterizations of random utility models in the
static setting (Barberá and Pattanaik, 1986; Block and Marschak, 1960; Falmagne, 1978; Luce,
1959; McFadden and Richter, 1990). Our approach incorporates as its static building block the
elegant axiomatization of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Ahn and Sarver (2013). A technical
contribution of our paper is the extension of their result to an infinite outcome space, which is
needed since the space of continuation problems in the dynamic model is infinite. Lu (2016)
studies a model with an objective state space where choice is between Anscombe-Aumann acts;
by imposing an assumption that utility is state-independent, he traces all randomness of choice
to random arrival of signals. This is similar in spirit to our gradual learning representation;
however, we do not rely on these strong independence assumptions: our state space is subjective
and utility can be state-dependent. A recent paper by Lu and Saito (2016) studies period-0
random choice between consumption lottery streams and attributes the source of randomness
of choice to the stochastic discount factor.51
The axiomatic literature on dynamic random utility, and more generally dynamic stochastic
choice, is very sparse. Our choice domain is as in Kreps and Porteus (1978); however, while
50Reducing consumption-dependent evolving utility (respectively, active learning) to evolving utility (respec-
tively, gradual learning) additionally requires Separability.
51Another recent contribution by Apesteguia, Ballester, and Lu (2017) considers a setting in which choice
options are linearly ordered.
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they study deterministic choice in each period, we focus on random choice in each period. To
the best of our knowledge, Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) is the first axiomatic study of
stochastic choice in general decision trees, but they focus on the special parametric case of logit
utility shocks that are i.i.d. over time, while we characterize a fully non-parametric dynamic
random utility model and allow for serially correlated utilities. Because of their i.i.d. assump-
tion, their representation does not give rise to history dependent choice behavior and cannot
accommodate phenomena such as learning, choice persistence, and consumption dependence;
likewise, challenges such as limited observability do not arise in their setting. In addition, their
model features very different attitudes toward option value than our evolving utility model,
as we discuss in Section 6.52 A recent paper by Ke (2017) characterizes a dynamic version of
the Luce model, where randomness of choices is caused by mistakes and there is no serially
correlated private information. In contrast to the evolving utility model, his model again does
not feature positive option value, as larger menus might induce more mistakes.
The literature on menu choice (Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 2001; Dekel, Lipman, Rus-
tichini, and Sarver, 2007; Dillenberger, Lleras, Sadowski, and Takeoka, 2014; Kreps, 1979)
considers an agent’s deterministic preference over menus (or decision trees) at a hypothetical
ex-ante stage in which the agent does not receive any information but anticipates receiving in-
formation later. An important difference of our approach is that we study the agent’s behavior
in actual decision trees, allowing information to arrive in each period and therefore focusing on
stochastic choice. We discuss the comparison in more detail in Section 2.2.3. Related papers are
Krishna and Sadowski (2014) and Krishna and Sadowski (2016) that study ex-ante preferences
over infinite-horizon decision trees and characterize stationary versions of our evolving utility
representation (making them unsuited to study gradual learning). Another related paper by
Ahn and Sarver (2013) studies both ex-ante preference over menus and ex-post stochastic choice
from menus; they show how to connect the analysis of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and of Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) to obtain better identification properties. Their sophistication
axiom plays a key role in our characterization of evolving utility.
Finally, as surveyed in Section 6, an extensive empirical literature uses specifications of
the i.i.d. DDC model. As mentioned, the specific parametric case of i.i.d. logit utility shocks
was axiomatized by Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015). Our DREU representation nests the
i.i.d. DDC model, while we show that i.i.d. DDC is incompatible with evolving utility because
it entails a negative option value. We also relate our uniqueness results to the identification
results in that literature.
52On more limited domains, Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014) study an agent who receives an out-
come only once at the end of a decision tree, and characterize a generalization of the Luce model. Pennesi
(2017) characterizes a version of the logit model where the analyst observes a history-independent sequence of
stochastic choice data over consumption streams. There is also non-axiomatic work studying special cases of
our representation where the agent makes a one-time consumption choice at a stopping time, e.g., Fudenberg,
Strack, and Strzalecki (2016).
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8.2 Conclusion
This paper provides the first analysis of the fully general and non-parametric model of dynamic
random utility. When utilities are serially correlated, a key new feature relative to the static
and i.i.d. model is that choices appear history dependent, a pervasive phenomenon in economic
applications. We axiomatically characterize the implied dynamic stochastic choice behavior,
imposing discipline on the form of history dependence that can arise under arbitrary serial
correlation.
Stochastic choice data in dynamic domains lets us distinguish important models that co-
incide in the static setting. In particular, choices that arise from learning rather than from
more general taste shocks display a form of stationary consumption preference, capturing the
martingale property of beliefs. Moreover, by distinguishing between past choices and real-
ized consumption, we can separate history dependence due to serially correlated utilities from
models of habit formation and experimentation, where past consumption directly affects the
agent’s utility process, and characterize when phenomena such as consumption persistence can
be explained through the former channel alone.
Our analysis has implications for the dynamic discrete choice literature. By utilizing menu
variation, we provide identification results that are complementary to those in the DDC liter-
ature. Moreover, unlike the widely used i.i.d. DDC model, our evolving utility representation
specifies payoff shocks in a manner that implies a positive option value. This may motivate
developing tractable parametric specifications of evolving utility for use in applications.
We also provide several methodological contributions that we believe may prove useful for
future work on stochastic choice: A solution to the limited observability problem that arises
from the fact that in dynamic settings past choices typically restrict future opportunity sets;
an extension to infinite outcome spaces of Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2006) and Ahn and Sarver’s
(2013) characterization of static random expected utility; and a way to infer, and impose
additional structure on, the agent’s preference conditional on any particular realization of her
private information. The latter revealed preference approach could potentially be used to
study other interesting special cases of DREU, such as dynamic models of random temptation
or mistakes. Finally, some techniques developed in this paper naturally carry over from the
multi-period to the multi-agent setting, and in ongoing work we exploit this to study strategic
interactions under correlated private information.
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Appendix: Main Proofs
The appendix is structured as follows:
• Section A defines equivalent versions of DREU, evolving utility, and gradual learning, as well as
other important terminology that is used throughout the appendix.
• Sections B–D prove Theorems 1–3.
• Section E collects together several lemmas that are used throughout Sections B–D.
The supplementary appendix contains the following additional material:
• Section F proves Theorem 0 (the static REU representation result for arbitrary separable metric
spaces of outcomes), which is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
• Section G proves Proposition 5 from Section A.
• Sections H, I, and J collect together proofs for Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 6, respectively.
• Finally, Section K contains formal definitions and representation theorems for the consumption
dependent representations from Section 7.
A joint file, including both the main text and supplementary appendix, is available at:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-372Fn5SRUAM3BYVmNrR2diR1E/view
A Equivalent Representations
Instead of working with probabilities over the grand state space Ω, our proofs of Theorems 1–3 will
employ equivalent versions of our representations, called S-based representations, that look at one-
step-ahead conditionals.53 Section A.1 defines S-based representations. Section A.2 establishes the
equivalence between DREU, evolving utility, and gradual learning representations and their respective
S-based analogs. Section A.3 introduces important terminology regarding the relationship between
states and histories that will be used throughout the proofs of Theorems 1–3.
A.1 S-based Representations
For any X ∈ {X0, . . . , XT }, A ∈ K(∆(X)), p ∈ ∆(X), let N(A, p) := {U ∈ RX : p ∈ M(A,U)} and
N+(A, p) := {U ∈ RX : {p} = M(A,U)}.
Definition 9. A random expected utility (REU) form on X ∈ {X0, . . . , XT } is a tuple
(S, µ, {Us, τs}s∈S) where
(i). S is a finite state space and µ is a probability measure on S
(ii). for each s ∈ S, Us ∈ RX is a nonconstant utility over X.
(iii). for each s ∈ S, the tie-breaking rule τs is a finitely-additive probability measure on the Borel
σ-algebra on RX and is proper, i.e., τs(N+(A, p)) = τs(N(A, p)) for all A, p.
53These are dynamic analogs of the static GP representations in Ahn and Sarver (2013).
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Given any REU form (S, µ, {Us, τs}s∈S) on Xi and any s ∈ S, Ai ∈ Ai, and pi ∈ ∆(Xi), define
τs(pi, Ai) := τs({w ∈ RXi : pi ∈M(M(Ai, Us), w)}).
Definition 10. An S-based DREU representation of ρ consists of tuples (S0, µ0, {Us0 , τs0}s0∈S0),
(St, {µst−1t }st−1∈St−1 , {Ust , τst}st∈St)1≤t≤T such that for all t = 0, . . . , T , we have:
DREU1: For all st−1 ∈ St−1, (St, µst−1t , {Ust , τst}st∈St) is an REU form on Xt such that54







t ) ∩ supp(µ
s′t−1






DREU2: For all pt, At, and h














An S-based evolving utility representation of ρ is an S-based DREU representation such that for
all t = 0, . . . , T , we additionally have:
EVU: For all st ∈ St, there exists ust ∈ RZ such that for all zt ∈ Z,At+1 ∈ At+1, we have




µstt+1(st+1) maxpt+1∈At+1 Ust+1(pt+1) for t ≤ T − 1 and VsT ≡ 0.
An S-based gradual learning representation is an S-based evolving-utility representation such that
additionally:








Proposition 5. Let ρ be a dynamic stochastic choice rule.
(i). ρ admits a DREU representation if and only if ρ admits an S-based DREU representation.
(ii). ρ admits an evolving utility representation if and only if ρ admits an S-based evolving utility
representation.
(iii). ρ admits a gradual learning representation if and only if ρ admits an S-based gradual learning
representation.
Proof. See Supplementary Appendix G. 
54For t = 0, we abuse notation by letting µ
st−1
t denote µ0 for all st−1.
55For t = 0, we again abuse notation by letting ρt(·|ht−1) denote ρ0(·) for all ht−1.
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A.3 Relationship between Histories and States
Throughout the proofs of Theorems 1–3 we will make use of the following terminology con-
cerning the relationship between histories and states. Fix any t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. Suppose that
(St′ , {µ
st′−1
t′ }st′−1∈St′−1 , {Ust′ , τst′}st′∈St′ ) satisfy DREU1 and DREU2 from Definition 10 for each t
′ ≤ t.
Fix any state s∗t ∈ St. We let pred(s∗t ) denote the unique predecessor sequence (s∗0, . . . , s∗t−1) ∈
S0 × . . . × St−1, given by assumptions DREU1 (b) and (c), such that s∗k+1 ∈ supp(µ
s∗k
k+1) for each
k = 0, ..., t − 1. Given any history ht = (A0, p0, . . . , At, pt), we say that s∗t is consistent with ht if∏t
k=0 τs∗k(pk, Ak) > 0.
For any k = 0, . . . , t, sk ∈ Sk, p0 ∈ A0 ∈ A0, and pk+1 ∈ Ak+1 ∈ Ak+1, let
Usk(Ak+1, pk+1) := {Usk+1 : sk+1 ∈ suppµ
sk
k+1 and pk+1 ∈M(Ak+1, Usk+1)};
U0(A0, p0) := {Us0 : s0 ∈ S0 and p0 ∈M(A0, Us0)}.
A separating history for s∗t is a history h
t = (B0, q0, ..., Bt, qt) such that Us∗k−1(Bk, qk) = {Us∗k} for
all k = 0, . . . , t and ht ∈ H∗t , where we abuse notation by letting Us∗−1(B0, q0) denote U0(B0, q0). Note
that separating histories are required to be histories without ties.
We record the following properties:
Lemma 1. Fix any s∗t ∈ St with pred(s∗t ) = (s∗0, . . . , s∗t−1). Suppose ht = (B0, q0, . . . , Bt, qt) satisfies
Us∗k−1(Bk, qk) = {Us∗k} for all k = 0, . . . , t. Then for all k = 0, . . . , t, s
∗
k is the only state in Sk that is
consistent with hk.
Proof. Fix any ` = 0, . . . , t. First, consider s′` ∈ S` r {s∗`}, with pred(s′`) = (s′0, . . . , s′`−1). Let
k ≤ ` be smallest such that s′k 6= s∗k. Then s′k ∈ suppµ
s∗k−1
k , so Us∗k−1(Bk, qk) = {Us∗k} implies that
qk /∈M(Bk, Us′k). Thus, τs′k(qk, Bk) = 0, whence s
′
` is not consistent with h
`.
Next, to show that s∗` is consistent with h







k (sk)τsk(qk, Bk) > 0. (11)




k (sk) = 0. And if (s0, . . . , s`−1) = pred(s`)
but s` 6= s∗` , then the first paragraph shows
∏`





k)τs∗k(qk, Bk) > 0, whence s
∗
` is consistent with h
`. 
Lemma 2. Every s∗t ∈ St admits a separating history.
Proof. Fix any s∗t ∈ St with pred(s∗t ) = (s∗0, . . . , s∗t−1). By Lemma 13 and DREU1 (a), there exist
menus B0 = {q0(s0) : s0 ∈ S0} ∈ A0 and Bk(sk−1) = {pk(sk) : sk ∈ suppµ
sk−1
k } ∈ Ak for each
k = 1, . . . , t and sk ∈ Sk such that U0(B0, q0(s0)) = {Us0} for all s0 ∈ S0 and Usk−1(Bk(sk−1), qk(sk)) =
{Usk} for all sk ∈ suppµ
sk−1
k . Moreover, we can assume that Bk+1(sk) ∈ supp qk(sk)
A for all k =
0, . . . , t − 1 and sk ∈ Sk, by letting each qk(sk) put small enough weight on (z,Bk+1(sk)) for some
z ∈ Z. Then ht := (B0, q0(s∗0), . . . , Bt(s∗t ), qt(s∗(t))) ∈ Ht. Moreover, since Us∗k−1(Bk, qk(s
∗
k)) = {Us∗k},
Lemma 1 implies that or all for all k = 0, . . . , t, s∗k is the only state consistent with h
k. Additionally,
for all k = 0, . . . , t and sk ∈ suppµ
s∗k−1
k , we have M(Bk(s
∗
k−1), Usk) = {qk(sk)} by construction. Hence,
by Lemma 14, we have Bk(s
∗
k−1) ∈ A∗k(hk−1). Thus ht ∈ H∗t , so ht is a separating history for s∗t . 
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B Proof of Theorem 1
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1: Sufficiency
Suppose ρ satisfies Axioms 1–4. To show that ρ admits a DREU representation, it suffices, by Propo-
sition 5, to construct an S-based DREU representation for ρ.
We proceed by induction on t ≤ T . First consider t = 0. Since ρ0 satisfies Axiom 3 and X0 is
a separable metric space by Lemma 12, the existence of (S0, µ0, {Us0 , τs0}s0∈S0) satisfying DREU1
and DREU2 from Definition 10 is immediate from Theorem 4, which extends Gul and Pesendorfer’s
(2006) and Ahn and Sarver’s (2013) characterization result for static S-based REU representations to
separable metric spaces and which we prove in Supplementary Appendix F.
Suppose next that 0 ≤ t < T and that we have constructed
(St′ , {µ
st′−1
t′ }st′−1∈St′−1 , {Ust′ , τst′}st′∈St′ ) satisfying DREU1 and DREU2 for each t
′ ≤ t. We
now construct (St+1, {µstt+1}st∈St , {Ust+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1) satisfying DREU1 and DREU2.
B.1.1 Defining ρstt+1 and (St+1, {µstt+1}st∈St , {Ust+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1):
To this end, we first pick an arbitrary separating history ht(st) for each st ∈ St (this exists by Lemma 2)
and define
ρstt+1(·, At+1) := ρt+1(·, At+1|h
t(st))
for all At+1 ∈ At+1. Note that here ρt+1(·, |ht(st)) is the extended version of ρt+1(·|ht(st)) given in
Definition 3; by Axiom 2 and Lemma 15, the specific choice of λ ∈ (0, 1] and dt−1 ∈ Dt−1 used in the
extension procedure does not matter.
By Axiom 3 and the fact that Xt+1 is separable metric (Lemma 12), Theorem 4 applied to ρ
st
t+1
yields an REU form (Sstt+1, µ
st





















t+1 and extend µ
st
t+1 to a probability measure on St+1 by setting µ
st
t+1(st+1) = 0
for all st+1 ∈ St+1 r Sstt+1.
By construction, it is immediate that (St+1, {µstt+1}st∈St , {Ust+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1) thus defined satis-





for all pt+1 and At+1. It remains to show that DREU2 is also satisfied.
B.1.2 ρstt+1 is well-behaved:
To this end, Lemma 3 below first shows that the definition of ρstt+1 is well-behaved, in the sense that
for any history ht that can only arise in state st, ρ
st
t+1 = ρt+1(·|ht).
Lemma 3. Fix any s∗t ∈ St with pred(s∗t ) = (s∗0, ..., s∗t−1). Suppose ht = (A0, p0, ..., At, pt) ∈ Ht






Proof. Step 1: Let h̃t = (Ã0, p̃0, . . . , Ãt, p̃t) denote the separating history for s
∗
t used to define ρ
s∗t
t+1.
We first prove the Lemma under the assumption that ht ∈ H∗t , i.e, that ht is itself a separating history
for s∗t .
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Pick (r0, ..., rt) ∈ ∆(X0)× . . .×∆(Xt) such that At+1 ∈ supp rAt and for all k = 0, . . . , t− 1,




















Note that since ht, h̃t ∈ H∗t and Us∗k−1(Ak, pk) = Us∗k−1(Ãk, p̃k) = {Us∗k}, Lemma 14 implies that
M(Ak, Us∗k) = {pk} and M(Ãk, Us∗k) = {p̃k} for all k = 0, 1, . . . , t. By linearity of the Us, we then also
have
Us∗k−1(Bk, qk) = Us∗k−1(B̃k, qk) = Us∗k−1(Bk ∪ B̃k, qk) = {Us∗k} and
M(Bk, Us∗k) = M(B̃k, Us
∗
k
) = M(Bk ∪ B̃k, Us∗k) = {qk}.
This implies that for all k = 0, . . . , t and sk ∈ suppµ
s∗k−1
k−1 ,
τsk(qk, Bk) = τsk(qk, B̃k) = τsk(qk, Bk ∪ B̃k) =
{









t ) = ρt(qt, Bt|B0, q0, . . . , Bt−1, qt−1) = ρt(qt, B̃t|B̃0, q0, . . . , B̃t−1, qt−1)
= ρt(qt, Bt ∪ B̃t|B0, q0, . . . , Bk−1, qk−1, Bk ∪ B̃k, qk, . . . , Bt−1 ∪ B̃t−1, qt−1)
= ρt(qt, Bt ∪ B̃t|B̃0, q0, . . . , B̃k−1, qk−1, Bk ∪ B̃k, qk, . . . , Bt−1 ∪ B̃t−1, qt−1),
whence repeated application of Axiom 1 (Contraction History Independence) yields
ρt+1(·, At+1|B0, q0, . . . , Bt, qt) = ρt+1(·, At+1|B0 ∪ B̃0, q0, . . . , Bt ∪ B̃t, qt) =
ρt+1(·, At+1|B̃0, q0, . . . , B̃t, qt).
(13)
Moreover, by Axiom 2 (Linear History Independence) and Lemma 15, we have
ρt+1(·, At+1|ht) = ρt+1(·, At+1|B0, q0, . . . , Bt, qt) and
ρt+1(·, At+1|h̃t) = ρt+1(·, At+1|B̃0, q0, . . . , B̃t, qt).
(14)
Combining (13) and (14) we obtain that ρt+1(·, At+1|ht) = ρt+1(·, At+1|h̃t) := ρ
s∗t
t+1(·, At+1). This
proves the Lemma for histories ht ∈ H∗t .
Step 2: Now suppose that ht /∈ H∗t . Take any sequence of histories ht,n →m ht with ht,n =
(An0 , p
n




t ) ∈ H∗t for each n. Note that such a sequence exists by Axiom 4 (History Continuity).




k) = {Us∗k} for all k = 0, . . . , t. Suppose for a
contradiction that we can find a subsequence (ht,n`)∞`=1 for which this claim is violated. Note that





k−1,n`) > 0 for all k = 0, . . . , t (by the fact that ht,n` is a well-defined history).
56Note that Us∗k−1(Ak, pk) = {Us∗k} for all k = 0, 1, . . . , t does not by itself imply that h
t is a history without
ties.
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Hence, DREU2 for k ≤ t implies that we can find s′t,n` ∈ St with pred(s
′
t,n`
) = (s′0,n` , . . . , s
′
t−1,n`)
and (s′0,n` , . . . , s
′
t,n`





k ) for all k = 0, . . . , t. Moreover,
since S0 × . . . × St is finite, by choosing the subsequence (ht,n`) appropriately, we can assume that
(s′0,n` , . . . , s
′
t,n`
) = (s′0, . . . , s
′
t) 6= (s∗0, . . . , s∗t ) for all `. Pick the smallest k such that s′k 6= s∗k and
pick any qk ∈ Ak. Since An`k →












k ), so Us′k(p
n`
k ) ≥ Us′k(q
n`
k ), whence Us′k(pk) ≥ Us′k(qk) by linearity of Us′k . Moreover,




k−1 . Thus, Us′k ∈ Us∗k−1(Ak, pk) = {Us∗k}. But s
′
k 6= s∗k, so by
DREU1 (a) of the inductive hypothesis Us′k 6≈ Us∗k , a contradiction.
By the previous paragraph, for large enough n, ht,n satisfies the assumption of the Lemma. Since
ht,n ∈ H∗t , Step 1 then shows that ρt+1(pt+1, At+1|ht,n) = ρ
s∗t
t+1(pt+1, At+1) for all large enough n and
all pt+1. By Axiom 4 (History Continuity), this implies that for all pt+1
ρt+1(pt+1, At+1|ht) ∈ co{lim
n
ρt+1(pt+1, At+1|ht,n) : ht,n →m ht, ht,n ∈ H∗t } = {ρ
s∗t
t+1(pt+1, At+1)},
which completes the proof. 
B.1.3 ρt+1(·|ht) is a weighted average of ρstt+1:
The next lemma shows that ρt+1(·|ht) can be expressed as a weighted average of the state-dependent
choice distributions ρstt+1, where the weight on each ρ
st
t+1 corresponds to the probability of st conditional
on history ht.
















Proof. Let {s1t , ..., smt } denote the set of states in St that are consistent with history ht (as defined
in Section A.3). For each j, let ĥt(j) = (Bj0, q
j




t ) be a separating history for state s
j
t . We






k) for some z, so that
ht(j) := 12h
t + 12 ĥ
t(j) ∈ Ht(At+1) for all j.



















































































The first equality holds by definition. The second equality follows from DREU2 of the inductive
hypothesis. For the final two equalities, note that since ĥt(j) is a separating history for sjt , we have









) (by Lemma 14). Also, since sjt
is consistent with ht, τ
sjk













2Bk) > 0 if and only if sk = s
j

































k}) = τsjk(pk, Ak), yielding the fourth equality.
Now let Ht := {ht(j) : j = 1, . . . ,m} ⊆ Ht(At+1). Note that by repeated application of Axiom 2,
we have that
ρt+1(pt+1, , At+1|ht) = ρt+1(pt+1, At+1|Ht). (16)





























































Indeed, the first equality holds by definition of choice conditional on a set of histories. The second
equality follows from Equation (15). Note next that since ĥt(j) is a separating history for sjt and s
j
t












k) = {Usjk} for each k. Hence, Lemma 3
implies that ρt+1(pt+1, At+1|ht(j)) = ρ
sjt
t+1(pt+1, At+1), yielding the third equality. Finally, note that
if (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S0 × . . . St with (s0, . . . , st) 6= (sj0, . . . , s
j
t ) for all j, then either st /∈ {s1t , . . . , smt },
or st = s
t
j for some j but (s0, . . . , st−1) 6= pred(s
j




k (sk)τsk(Ak, pk) = 0,
yielding the final equality. Combining (16) and (17), we obtain the desired conclusion. 
B.1.4 Completing the proof:
Finally, combining Lemma 4 with the representation of ρstt+1 in (12) yields that for any h
t =
































Thus, (St+1, {µstt+1}st∈St , {Ust+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1) also satisfies requirement DREU2, completing the
proof.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1: Necessity
Suppose ρ admits a DREU representation. By Proposition 5, ρ admits an S-based DREU representa-
tion. By Lemma 16, for each t and ht ∈ Ht, the (static) stochastic choice rule ρt(·|ht) : At → ∆(∆(Xt))
given by the extended version of ρ from Definition 3 also satisfies DREU2. In other words, ρt(·|ht)
admits an S-based REU representation (see Definition 11). Thus, Theorem 4 implies that Axiom 3
holds. It remains to verify that Axioms 1, 2, and 4 are satisfied.
Claim 1. ρ satisfies Axiom 1 (Contraction History Independence).
Proof. Take any ht−1 = (ht−1−k , (Ak, pk)), ĥ
t−1 = (ht−1−k , (Bk, pk)) ∈ Ht−1(At) such that Bk ⊇ Ak and





















Since Bk ⊇ Ak implies τsk(pk, Ak) ≥ τsk(pk, Bk) for all sk, the only way for (18) to hold is if
















Claim 2. ρ satisfies Axiom 2 (Linear History Independence).
Proof. Take any At, h
t−1 = (A0, p0, . . . , At−1, pt−1) ∈ Ht−1(At), and Ht−1 ⊆ Ht−1(At) of the form
Ht−1 = {(ht−1−k , (λAk + (1 − λ)Bk, λpk + (1 − λ)qk)) : qk ∈ Bk} for some k < t, λ ∈ (0, 1), and
Bk = {qjk : j = 1, . . . ,m} ∈ Ak. Let Ãk := λAk + (1 − λ)Bk, and for each j = 1, . . . ,m, let
p̃jk := λpk + (1− λ)q
j
k and h̃
t−1(j) := (ht−1−k , (Ãk, p̃
j
k)).












































































































Xk : pk ∈M(M(Ak, Usk), w) and qk ∈M(M(Bk, Usk), w)})
= τsk({w ∈ R
Xk : pk ∈M(M(Ak, Usk), w)})
= τsk(pk, Ak),
(21)
where the second equality follows from linearity of the representation, the third equality from the
fact that τsk is a proper finitely-additive probability measure on RXk , and the remaining equalities
hold by definition. Combining (19), (20), and (21), we obtain ρt(pt;At|ht−1) = ρt(pt;At|Ht−1), as
required. 
Claim 3. ρ satisfies Axiom 4 (History Continuity).
Proof. Fix any At, pt ∈ At, and ht−1 = (A0, p0, ..., At−1, pt−1) ∈ Ht−1. Let St−1(ht−1) ⊆ St−1


































Hence, ρt(pt;At|ht−1) ∈ co{ρst−1t (pt;At) : st−1 ∈ St−1(ht−1)}. Fix any s∗t−1 ∈ St−1(ht−1). To prove
the claim, it is sufficient to show that
ρ
s∗t−1
t (pt;At) ∈ {limn ρt(pt;At|h
t−1
n ) : h
t−1
n →m ht−1, ht−1n ∈ H∗t−1}.
To this end, let pred(s∗t−1) = (s
∗
0, . . . , s
∗
t−2) and let h̄
t−1 = (B0, q0, ..., Bt−1, qt−1) ∈ H∗t−1 be a
separating history for s∗t−1. By Lemma 17, for each k = 0, . . . , t − 1, we can find sequences Ank ∈




k) = {Us∗k} for all n and
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all k = 0, . . . , t − 1. Working backwards from k = t − 2, we can inductively replace Ank and pnk
with a mixture putting small weight on (z,Ank+1) for some z to ensure that A
n
k+1 ∈ supp p
n,A
k for all
k ≤ t − 2 while maintaining the properties in the previous sentence. Then by construction ht−1n :=
(An0 , p
n





























t (st)τst(pt, At) =: ρ
s∗t−1
t (pt;At)
for each n. Since ht−1n →m ht−1, this verifies the desired claim. 
C Proof of Theorem 2
C.1 Implications of %ht
We begin with a preliminary lemma that characterizes the implications of the history-dependent
revealed preference %ht .
Lemma 5. Suppose that ρ admits an S-based DREU representation. Consider any t ≤ T − 1,
ht = (A0, p0, . . . , At, pt) ∈ Ht, and qt, rt ∈ ∆(Xt).
(i). If qt %ht rt, then Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt) for all st consistent with ht.
(ii). Suppose there exist g, b ∈ ∆(Xt) such that Ust(g) > Ust(b) for all st consistent with ht. If
Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt) for all st consistent with ht, then qt %ht rt.
(iii). If ht is a separating history for st, then qt %ht rt if and only if Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt).
Proof. (i): We prove the contrapositive. Suppose there exists st consistent with h
t such that
Ust(qt) < Ust(rt). Since st is consistent with h
t, we have Πtk=0 µ
sk−1
k (sk)τsk(pk, Ak) > 0 for
pred(st) = (s0, . . . , st−1). Moreover, Ust(qt) < Ust(rt) implies that for any q
n
t →m qt and rnt →m rt,
we have Ust(q
n
t ) < Ust(r
n


























t }|ht−1) > 0.
Thus, by definition, qt 6%ht rt.
(ii): Let St(h
t) denote the set of st consistent with h
t. Suppose Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt) for all st ∈ St(ht).







n+1b for all n, we have q
n
t →m qt, rnt →m rt, and Ust(qnt ) > Ust(rnt ) for all n and





































t (st)τst(pt, At) =


















t }) = 0. By














t }|ht−1) = 0 for all n, i.e., qt %ht rt.
(iii): Finally, suppose ht is a separating history for st. If qt %ht rt, then Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt) by
part (i). For the converse, note that since Ust is non-constant, there exist g, b ∈ ∆(Xt) such that
Ust(g) > Ust(b). Since st is the only state consistent with h
t (recall Lemma 1), part (ii) implies that
if Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt) then qt %ht rt. 
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 2: Sufficiency
Throughout this section, we assume that ρ admits a DREU representation and satisfies Axioms 5–7.
We will show that ρ admits an evolving utility representation. By Proposition 5, it is sufficient to
construct an S-based evolving utility representation. Sections C.2.1–C.2.5 accomplish this.
C.2.1 Recursive Construction up to t
The construction proceeds recursively. Suppose that t ≤ T − 1. Assume that we have obtained
(St′ , {µ
st′−1
t′ }st′−1∈St′−1 , {Ust′ , τst′}st′∈St′ ) for each t
′ ≤ t such that DREU1 and DREU2 hold for all
t′ ≤ t and EVU holds for all t′ ≤ t − 1 (see Definition 10 for the statements of these conditions).
Note that the base case t = 0 is true because of the fact that ρ admits a DREU representation and
by Proposition 5 (the requirement that EVU holds for t′ ≤ t − 1 is vacuous here). To complete the
proof, we will construct (St+1, {µstt+1}st∈St , {Ust+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1) such that DREU1 and DREU2 hold
for t′ ≤ t+ 1 and EVU holds for t′ ≤ t.
C.2.2 Properties of Ust
Using Lemma 5, the following lemma translates Axioms 5 (Separability) and 6 (DLR Menu Preference)
into properties of Ust .
Lemma 6. For any st ∈ St, there exist functions ust : Z → R and Vst : At+1 → R such that
(i). Ust(zt, At+1) = ust(zt) + Vst(At+1) holds for each (zt, At+1)
(ii). Vst is continuous
(iii). Vst is monotone, i.e., Vst(A
′
t+1) ≥ Vst(At+1) for any At+1 ⊆ A′t+1
(iv). Vst is linear, i.e., Vst(αAt+1 + (1 − α)A′t+1) = αVst(At+1) + (1 − α)Vs(A′t+1) for all At+1, A′t+1
and α ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, there exist C ′t+1, Ct+1 ∈ At+1 such that Vst(C ′t+1) > Vst(Ct+1) for all st ∈ St.
Proof. Fix any st ∈ St and a separating history ht for st, the existence of which is guaranteed by
Lemma 2.
For (i), it suffices, by standard arguments, to show that






t, At+1) + Ust(zt, A
′
t+1)
for all zt, z
′
t, and At+1, A
′
t+1. Fix any zt, z
′
t, and At+1, A
′
t+1. By Axiom 5 (Separability), we




























t+1). This proves that there exist functions
ust : Z → R and Vst : At+1 → R such that Ust(zt, At+1) = ust(zt) + Vst(At+1) for each (zt, At+1), as
required.
For (ii), note that since %ht is continuous on ∆(Xt) by Axiom 6 (iii) (Continuity) and represented
by Ust (by Lemma 5 (iii)), Ust is continuous. By part (i), this implies that Vst is continuous on At+1.
For (iii), suppose At+1 ⊆ A′t+1 and fix any zt. By Axiom 6 (i) (Monotonicity), we have
(zt, A
′
t+1) %ht (zt, At+1). By Lemma 5, this implies that Ust(zt, A
′
t+1) ≥ Ust(zt, At+1), whence
Vst(A
′
t+1) ≥ Vst(At+1) by (i).
For (iv), fix any At+1, A
′
t+1, zt, and α ∈ (0, 1). Axiom 6 (ii) (Indifference to Timing) implies
(zt, αAt+1+(1−α)A′t+1) ∼ht α(zt, At+1)+(1−α)(zt, A′t+1), which by Lemma 5 implies Ust((zt, αAt+1+
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(1− α)A′t+1)) = Ust(α(zt, At+1) + (1− α)(zt, A′t+1)). By linearity and separability of Ust , this implies
Vst(αAt+1 + (1− α)A′t+1) = αVst(At+1) + (1− α)Vst(A′t+1), as required.
Finally, for the “moreover” part, again consider any s∗t and separating history h
t for s∗t . By




















t )) > Vs∗t (At+1(s
∗

















t ). Then for all st and s
′





t)), where by construction this inequality is strict whenever st = s
′
t. By linearity of Vst , this
implies Vst(C
′
t+1) > Vst(Ct+1). 
Corollary C.1. Fix any t ≤ T − 1 and ht ∈ Ht. Then qt %ht rt if and only if Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt) for
all st consistent with h
t.
Proof. The “only if” direction is a restatement of part (i) of Lemma 5. For the “if” direction, let
C ′t+1 and Ct+1 be as in the “moreover” part of Lemma 6. Pick any z ∈ Z and let gt+1 := δ(z,C′t+1)
and bt+1 := δ(z,Ct+1). Then by Lemma 6, Ust(gt+1) > Ust(bt+1) for all st. Hence, the “if” direction is
immediate from part (ii) of Lemma 5. 
C.2.3 Construction of Random Utility in Period t+ 1
Since ρ admits a DREU representation, it admits an S-based DREU representation by Proposition 5, so
in particular we can obtain (St+1, {µstt+1}st∈St , {Ũst+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1) satisfying DREU1 and DREU2





µstt+1(st+1)τst+1(pt+1, At+1) for all
pt+1, At+1.
C.2.4 Sophistication and Finiteness of Menu Preference
Before completing the representation, we establish two more lemmas. Using Axiom 7 (Sophistication),
the first lemma ensures that for each st, ρ
st
t+1 and the preference over At+1 induced by Vst satisfy
Axioms 1 and 2 in Ahn and Sarver (2013).








Proof. Pick any separating history ht for st. Note that by DREU2 at t + 1 and Lemma 16, we have
ρt+1(A
′




t+1 rAt+1;A′t+1). Moreover, by Corollary C.1 and Lemma 6 (i),
Vst(A
′
t+1) > Vst(At+1) if and only if (zt, A
′
t+1) ht (zt, At+1) for all zt. By Axiom 7, this implies that
Vst(A
′




t+1 rAt+1;A′t+1) > 0, as claimed. 
The next lemma shows that because of Lemma 7, the finiteness of each suppµstt+1 is enough to ensure
that the preference over At+1 induced by each Vst satisfies Axiom DLR 6 (Finiteness) introduced by
Ahn and Sarver (2013):
Lemma 8. For each st ∈ St, there is Kst > 0 such that for any At+1, there is Bt+1 ⊆ At+1 such that
|Bt+1| ≤ Kst and Vst(At+1) = Vst(Bt+1).
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Proof. Fix any st ∈ St and a separating history ht for st. Let St+1(st) := suppµstt+1. We will show
that Kst := |St+1(st)| is as required.
Step 1: First consider any At+1 ∈ A∗t+1(ht). Then by Lemma 14, for each st+1 ∈ St+1(st) we have
|M(At+1, Ũst+1)| = 1. Letting Bt+1 :=
⋃
st+1∈St+1(st)M(At+1, Ũst+1), we then have that |Bt+1| ≤ Kst
and ρstt+1(At+1 rBt+1|At+1) = 0. By Lemma 7, this implies that Vst(At+1) = Vst(Bt+1), as required.
Step 2: Next take any At+1 6∈ A∗t+1(ht). By Lemma 17, we can find a sequence Ant+1 →m At+1 with





t+1). By definition of→m, for each qt+1 ∈ At+1, there exists Dt+1(qt+1) ∈ At+1
and a sequence αn(qt+1)→ 0 such that Bnt+1 ⊆
⋃
qt+1∈At+1 αn(qt+1)Dt+1(qt+1) + (1− αn(qt+1)){qt+1}
for all n. Hence, since |Bnt+1| ≤ Kst for all n, restricting to a subsequence if necessary, there is
Bt+1 ⊆ At+1 such that Bnt+1 →m Bt+1 and such that |Bt+1| ≤ Kst . Finally, by continuity of Vst
(Lemma 6 (ii)), we have Vst(Bt+1) = Vst(At+1), as required. 
C.2.5 Completing the representation
Recall that in Section C.2.3, we have obtained (St+1, {µstt+1}st∈St , {Ũst+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1) satisfying
DREU1 and DREU2 at t + 1. We now show that for each st+1 ∈ St+1 there exist αst+1 > 0 and
βst+1 ∈ R such that after replacing Ũst+1 with Ust+1 := αst+1Ũst+1 + βst+1 , we additionally have that
EVU holds at time t.
Fix any st and let St+1(st) := suppµ
st
t+1. Note that by DREU1 at t + 1 and since we have






t+1(st+1)τst+1(pt+1, At+1) for all pt+1 and At+1, it
follows that (St+1(st), µ
st




Since all the Ust+1 are non-constant and induce different preferences over ∆(Xt+1) for distinct
st+1, s
′
t+1 ∈ St+1(st) and since Vst is nonconstant by Lemma 6, we can find a finite set Y ⊆ Xt+1
such that (i) Vst is non-constant on At+1(Y ) := {Bt+1 ∈ At+1 : ∪pt+1∈Bt+1supp(pt+1) ⊆ Y }; (ii) for
each st+1 ∈ St+1(st), Ũst+1 is non-constant on Y ; and (iii) for each distinct pair st+1, s′t+1 ∈ St+1(st),
Ũst+1 6≈ Ũs′t+1 on Y .
Observe that by Lemmas 6 and 8, the preference %st on At+1(Y ) induced by Vst satisfies Axioms
DLR 1–6 (Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Nontriviality, Finiteness) in Ahn
and Sarver (2013) (henceforth AS), so by Corollary S1 in AS %st admits a DLR representation (see
Definition S1 in AS). Moreover, since ρstt+1 admits an S-based REU representation (what AS call a GP
representation), so does its restriction to At+1(Y ). Finally, by Lemma 7, the pair (%st , ρstt+1) satisfies
AS’s Axioms 1 and 2 on At+1(Y ). Thus, by Theorem 1 in AS, we can find a DLR-GP representation of
(%st , ρ
st
t+1) on At+1(Y ), i.e., an S-based REU representation (Ŝt+1(st), µ̂
st
t+1, {Ûst+1 , τ̂st+1}st+1∈Ŝt+1(st))
of ρstt+1 on At+1(Y ) such that %st restricted to At+1(Y ) is represented by V̂st , where V̂st(At+1) :=∑
st+1∈Ŝt+1(st) µ̂
st
t+1(st+1) maxpt+1∈At+1 Ûst+1(pt+1). Since Vst also represents %st restricted to At+1(Y ),
standard arguments yield α̂st > 0 and β̂st ∈ R such that for all At+1 ∈ At+1(Y ), we have Vst(At+1) =







where Ust+1 = α̂stÛst+1 + β̂st . By the uniqueness properties of S-based REU represen-
tations (Proposition 4 in AS), (Ŝt+1(st), µ̂
st
t+1, {Ust+1 , τ̂st+1}st+1∈Ŝt+1(st)) still constitutes an S-




t+1, {Ũst+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1(st)) also represents ρ
st
t+1 on At+1(Y ), we can assume after re-




t+1 and that for each st+1 ∈ St+1(st), there exist constants
αst+1 > 0 and βst+1 ∈ R such that
Ust+1(xt+1) = αst+1Ũst+1(xt+1) + βst+1 (23)
for each xt+1 ∈ Y ⊆ Xt+1. Since Ũst+1 is defined on Xt+1, we can extend Ust+1 to
the whole space Xt+1 by (23). Then Ust+1 and Ũst+1 represent the same preference over
∆(Xt+1), so since (St+1(st), µ
st
t+1, {Ũst+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1(st)) satisfies DREU1 and DREU2, so does
(St+1(st), µ
st
t+1, {Ust+1 , τst+1}st+1∈St+1(st)).
It remains to show that (22) holds for all At+1 ∈ At+1, so that EVU is satisfied at st. To see this,
consider any At+1 ∈ At+1 and choose a finite set Y ′ ⊆ Xt+1 such that Y ∪
⋃
pt+1∈At+1 supp(pt+1) ⊆
Y ′. As above, we can again apply Theorem 1 in AS to obtain a DLR-GP representation
(S̄t+1(st), µ̄
s′t
t+1, {Ūst+1 , τ̄st+1}st+1∈S̄t+1(st)) of the pair (%st , ρ
st
t+1) restricted to At+1(Y ′). But since this
also yields a DLR-GP representation of (%st , ρ
st
t+1) restricted to At+1(Y ), by the uniqueness property of





that there exists ᾱst > 0 and β̄st+1 ∈ R such that Ūst+1 = ᾱstUst+1+β̄st+1 for each st+1 ∈ St+1(st). Since




t+1(st+1) maxpt+1∈Bt+1 Ūst+1(pt+1) and
since ᾱst depends only on st (and not on st+1), it follows that %st is also represented on At+1(Y ′)




t+1(st+1) maxpt+1∈Bt+1 Ust+1(pt+1). Thus, the linear functions Vst and
V ′st represent the same preference on At+1(Y
′) and coincide on At+1(Y ), so they must also coincide
on At+1(Y ′). Thus, (22) holds at At+1.
This shows that EVU holds at t. Combining this with the inductive hypothesis, it follows that
(St′ , {µ
st′−1
t′ }st′−1∈St′−1 , {Ust′ , τst′}st′∈St′ ) satisfies DREU1 and DREU2 for all t
′ ≤ t + 1 and EVU for
all t′ ≤ t, as required.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 2: Necessity
Suppose that ρ admits an evolving utility representation. Then by Proposition 5, ρ admits an S-based
evolving utility representation (St, {µst−1t }st−1∈St−1 , {Ust , ust , τst}st∈St).
We first show that for every t ≤ T − 1, there exist gt, bt ∈ ∆(Xt) such that Ust(gt) > Ust(bt)
for all st ∈ St. By separability of Ust , it is sufficient to find menus C ′t+1, Ct+1 such that
Vst(C
′
t+1) > Vst(Ct+1) for all st. Note first that for any st+1 ∈ St+1, since Ust+1 is nonconstant,
we can find gt+1(st+1), bt+1(st+1) ∈ ∆(Xt+1) such that Ust+1(gt+1(st+1)) > Ust+1(bt+1(st+1)). Let
C ′t+1 := {gt+1(st+1), bt+1(st+1) : st+1 ∈ St+1}, and for every st, let At+1(st) := {bt+1(st+1)} for some





|St|At+1(st), linearity implies Vst(C
′
t+1) > Vst(Ct+1) for all st, as required.
By Lemma 5, the previous paragraph implies that for all t ≤ T − 1, ht and qt, rt, we have qt %ht rt
if and only if Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt) for all st consistent with ht. Axioms 5 (Separability) and 6 (i)–(ii)
(Monotonicity and Indifference to Timing) are then straightforward to verify from the representation.
Moreover, C ′t+1 and Ct+1 from the previous paragraph satisfy (zt, C
′
t+1) ht (zt, Ct+1) for all ht and
zt, implying Axiom 6 (iv) (Nondegeneracy).
To show Axiom 7 (Sophistication), consider any t ≤ T − 1, ht, zt, and At+1 ⊆ A′t+1 ∈ A∗(ht).
Since A′t+1 ∈ A∗(ht), Lemma 14 implies that ρt+1(A′t+1 r At+1;A′t+1|ht) > 0 holds if and only if
there exists some st consistent with h
t such that maxpt+1∈A′t+1 Ust+1(pt+1) > maxpt+1∈At+1 Ust+1(pt+1)
for some st+1 ∈ suppµstt+1, which by the representation is equivalent to Vst(A′t+1) > Vst(At+1). By




t+1) ht (zt, At+1).
Finally, to show Axiom 6 (iii) (Continuity), note first that for each sT−1 ∈ ST−1,∑
sT∈ST µ
sT−1
T (sT ) maxpT∈AT UsT (pT ) is continuous in menu AT . Assuming inductively that for each




k+1(sk+1) maxpk+1∈Ak+1 Usk+1(pk+1) is continuous in menu Ak+1,




t+1(st+1) maxpt+1∈At+1 Ust+1(pt+1) is con-
tinuous in menu At+1. Thus for each st, Ust(pt) is continuous in pt. Then Continuity follows as,
for each pt, {qt : qt %ht pt} = ∩st:consistent with ht{qt : Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(pt)} and {qt : pt %ht qt} =
∩st:consistent with ht{qt : Ust(pt) ≥ Ust(qt)} are closed.
D Proof of Theorem 3
D.1 Proof of Theorem 3: Sufficiency
Suppose that ρ admits an evolving utility representation and that Condition 1 and Axioms 8 (Sta-
tionary Consumption Preference) and 9 (Constant Intertemporal Tradeoff) hold. By Proposition 5, ρ
admits an S-based evolving utility representation (St, {µst−1t }st−1∈St−1 , {Ust , ust , τst}st∈St)t=0,...,T . Up
to adding appropriate constants to each utility ust and Ust , we can ensure that
∑
z∈Z ust(z) = 0 for
all t = 0, ..., T and st ∈ St without affecting that (St, {µst−1t }st−1∈St−1 , {Ust , ust , τst}st∈St)t=0,...,T is
an S-based evolving utility representation of ρ. We will show that this representation is in fact an
S-based gradual learning representation, i.e., that there exists a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all t ≤ T − 1 and st, we have ust = 1δ
∑
st+1
µstt+1(st+1)ust+1 . By Proposition 5, this implies that ρ
admits a gradual learning representation.
Condition 1 implies that each ust is nonconstant:
Lemma 9. For each t = 0, .., T − 1 and st ∈ St, there exist `,m ∈ ∆(Z) such that ust(`) 6= ust(m).
Proof. Consider any t = 0, . . . , T − 1, st ∈ St and separating history ht for st. By Condition 1,
there exist `,m, n ∈ ∆(Z) such that (`, n, . . . , n) 6∼ht (m,n, . . . , n). Then Lemma 5 (iii) implies that
Ust((`, n, . . . , n)) 6= Ust((m,n, . . . , n)), whence ust(`) 6= ust(m), as required. 





denote the expected period t+ 1 felicity of ` at state st. Stationary Consumption Preference implies
that ust and E[ut+1|st] induce the same preference over ∆(Z):
Lemma 10. For all `,m ∈ ∆(Z), t = 0, ..., T − 1, and st ∈ St,
E[ut+1(`)|st] > E[ut+1(m)|st]⇐⇒ ust(`) > ust(m).
Proof. Fix any `,m, n ∈ ∆(Z), t = 0, ..., T − 1, st ∈ St and separating history ht for st. Note that
ust(`) > ust(m) if and only if Ust((`, n, . . . , n)) > Ust((m,n, . . . , n), which by Lemma 5 (iii) is in turn
equivalent to (`, n, . . . , n) ht (m,n, . . . , n). Likewise, E[ut+1(`)|st] > E[ut+1(m)|st] if and only if
Ust((n, `, n, . . . , n)) > Ust((n,m, n, . . . , n)), which by Lemma 5 (iii) is equivalent to (n, `, n, . . . , n) ht
(n,m, n, . . . , n). Thus, the claim is immediate from Axiom 8. 
Given Lemma 10, Constant Intertemporal Tradeoff now allows us to obtain a time-invariant and
non-random discount factor δ > 0.
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Lemma 11. There exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and st ∈ St, we have ust =
1
δE[ut+1|st].
Proof. Fix any t, t̂ ≤ T − 1, st ∈ St, ŝt̂ ∈ St̂, and separating histories ht for st and ĥt̂ for ŝt̂. By
Lemma 10, ust and E[ut+1|st] induce the same preference over ∆(Z), and moreover, ust is nonconstant
by Lemma 9. Hence, there exist constants γst > 0, βst ∈ R such that ust = γstE[ut+1|st] + βst . Since
we have normalized felicities such that
∑
z∈Z ust′ (z) = 0 for any t
′ and st′ , we must have βst = 0.








. We first show that δst = δ̂ŝt̂ . By Condition 1, there exist h
t-
nonindifferent `,m ∈ ∆(Z) and ĥt̂-nonindifferent ˆ̀, m̂ ∈ ∆(Z). For any α ∈ (0, 1) and n ∈ ∆(Z),
Lemma 5 (iii) along with the above implies
(α`+ (1− α)m,α`+ (1− α)m,n, . . . , n) ∼ht (`,m, n, . . . , n)
⇐⇒






where the final equivalence holds because ust(`) 6= ust(m) (Lemma 9). Likewise, we have (αˆ̀+ (1 −




. Since by Axiom 9, we have
(α` + (1 − α)m,α` + (1 − α)m,n, . . . , n) ∼ht (`,m, n, . . . , n) if and only if (αˆ̀+ (1 − α)m̂, αˆ̀+ (1 −
α)m̂, n, . . . , n) ∼ĥt̂ (ˆ̀, m̂, n, . . . , n), this implies δst = δ̂ŝt̂ =: δ.

This completes the proof that ρ admits an S-based gradual learning representation.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 3: Necessity
Suppose that ρ admits a gradual learning representation and Condition 1 holds. By Proposition 5,
ρ admits an S-based gradual learning representation (St, {µst−1t }st−1∈St−1 , {Ust , ust , τst}st∈St)t=0,...,T
with discount factor δ > 0.
The same argument as in the proof of the necessity direction of Theorem 2 shows that for all
t ≤ T − 1, ht and qt, rt ∈ ∆(Xt), we have qt %ht rt if and only if Ust(qt) ≥ Ust(rt) for all st consistent
with ht.
Given this, Axiom 8 is equivalent to the statement that for all st, ust and E[ut+1|st] represent
the same preference over ∆(Z). But this is immediate from the fact that for all st, we have ust =
1
δE[ut+1|st].
Finally, to establish Axiom 9, consider any t ≤ T−1, ht, and ht-nonindifferent `,m ∈ ∆(Z). By the
second paragraph, for any α ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ ∆(Z), we have (α`+(1−α)m,α`+(1−α)m,n, . . . , n) ∼ht
(`,m, n, . . . , n) if and only if Ust((α` + (1 − α)m,α` + (1− α)m,n, . . . , n)) = Ust((`,m, n, . . . , n)) for
all st consistent with h
t. Since ust =
1
δE[ut+1|st], this is equivalent to
(1 + δ)(α(ust(`) + (1− α)ust(m)) = ust(`) + δust(m) for all st consistent with ht. (24)
But since `,m are ht-nonindifferent, there is some s∗t consistent with h
t such that us∗t (`) 6= us∗t (m),
whence (24) is equivalent to α = 11+δ . Since this holds for all h




Lemma 12. For all t = 0, . . . , T , Xt is a separable metric space, where XT := Z is endowed with
the discrete metric and for all t ≤ T − 1, we recursively endow ∆(Xt+1) with the induced topology
of weak convergence, At+1 := K(∆(Xt+1)) with the induced Hausdorff topology, and Xt := Z ×At+1
with the induced product topology.
Proof. By standard arguments, for any separable metric space (Y, d): (a) the set P(Y ) of Borel
probability measures on Y endowed with the topology of weak convergence is a separable metric space
metrized by the Prokhorov metric πd induced by d (e.g., Theorem 15.12 in Aliprantis and Border
(2006)); (b) the set KC(Y ) of nonempty compact subsets of Y endowed with the Hausdorff distance
induced by d is a separable metric space (e.g., Khamsi and Kirk (2011) p. 40); (c) every dense subspace
of Y is separable.
We now prove the claim inductively, working backwards from period T . Since XT := Z is finite, the
claim is immediate. Consider t < T and suppose that Xτ is a separable metric space for all τ ≥ t+ 1.
By (a) above, P(Xt+1) endowed with the induced Prokhorov metric is separable, so since ∆(Xt+1) is
dense in P(Xt+1) (e.g., Theorem 15.10 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)) ∆(Xt+1) is also separable (by
(c)). Then by (b) above, KC(∆(Xt+1)) endowed with the induced Hausdorff metric is separable, so
since At+1 := K(∆(Xt+1)) is dense in KC(∆(Xt+1)) (e.g., Lemma 0 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)),
At+1 is also separable. Finally, Xt := Z ×At+1 endowed with the product of the discrete metric and
the Hausdorff metric is separable, as required. 
Lemma 13. Let Y be any set (possibly infinite) and let {Us : s ∈ S} ⊆ RY be a collection of
nonconstant vNM utility functions indexed by a finite set S such that Us 6≈ Us′ for any distinct
s, s′ ∈ S. Then there is a collection of lotteries {ps : s ∈ S} ⊆ ∆(Y ) such that Us(ps) > Us(ps
′
) for
any distinct s, s′ ∈ S.
Proof. By the finiteness of S, there is a finite set Y ′ ⊆ Y such that for each s the restriction Us Y ′
to Y ′ is nonconstant and for any distinct s, s′, Us Y ′ 6≈ Us′ Y ′ (that is, there exists p, q ∈ ∆(Y ′) such
that Us(p) ≥ Us(q) and Us′(p) < Us′(q)). By Lemma 1 in Ahn and Sarver (2013), there is a collection




distinct s, s′. 
Lemma 14. Fix t = 0, . . . , T . Suppose (St′ , {µ
st′−1
t′ }st′−1∈St′−1 , {Ust′ , τst′}st′∈St′ ) satisfy DREU1 and
DREU2 for all t′ ≤ t. Take any ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 and let S(ht−1) ⊆ St−1 denote the set of states consistent
with ht−1. Then for any At ∈ At, the following are equivalent:
(i). At ∈ A∗t (ht−1)
(ii). For each st−1 ∈ S(ht−1) and st ∈ suppµst−1t , |M(At, Ust)| = 1.
Proof.
(i) =⇒ (ii): We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that there is st−1 ∈ S(ht−1) and st ∈ suppµst−1t
such that |M(At, Ust)| > 1. Pick any pt ∈ M(At, Ust) such that τst(pt, At) > 0. Since Ust is non-
constant, we can find lotteries r, r ∈ ∆(Xt) such that Ust(r) < Ust(r). Fix any sequence αn ∈ (0, 1)
with αn → 0. Let pnt := αnr + (1 − αn)pt. For every qt ∈ At r {pt}, let qnt := αnr + (1 − αn)qt and
qnt := αnr + (1 − αn)qt. Let Bnt := {qnt : qt ∈ At r {pt}}, let B
n





t . Then B
n
t →m At r {pt} and pnt →m pt.
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Moreover, since |M(At, Ust)| > 1, there exists qt ∈ At r {pt} such that Ust(αnr + (1 − αn)qt) >
Ust(p
n




t ∪ {pnt }) = 0. Furthermore, note that for all s′t ∈ St r {st}, we
have N(M(At, Us′t), pt) = N(M(B
n
t ∪{pnt }, Us′t), p
n
t ) ⊇ N(M(Bnt ∪{pnt }, Us′t), p
n





t ∪{pnt }) for all n. Letting pred(st−1) = (s0, . . . , st−2), Lemma 16 then implies that for all n,
























































t ∪{pnt }|ht−1) < ρt(pt;At|ht−1).
By definition of A∗t , this means At /∈ A∗t (ht−1).
(ii) =⇒ (i): Suppose At satisfies (ii). Consider any pt ∈ At, pnt →m pt, Bnt →m Atr{pt}. Consider any
st−1 ∈ S(ht−1) and st ∈ suppµst−1t . By (ii), we either have M(At, Ust) = {pt} or pt /∈ M(At, Ust). In
the former case, Ust(pt) > Ust(qt) for all qt ∈ Atr{pt}. But then, for all n large enough, linearity of Ust
implies Ust(p
n
t ) > Ust(q
n
t ) for all q
n
t ∈ Bnt , i.e., τst(pt, At) = limn τst(pnt , Bnt ∪ {pnt }) = 1. In the latter
case, Ust(pt) < Ust(qt) for some qt ∈ Atr{pt}. But then, for all n large enough, linearity of Ust implies
Ust(p
n
t ) < Ust(q
n
t ) for all q
n
t ∈ Bnt such that qnt →m qt, i.e., τst(pt, At) = limn τst(pnt , Bnt ∪ {pnt }) = 0.
Thus, for all st−1 ∈ S(ht−1) and st ∈ suppµst−1t , we have τst(pt, At) = limn τst(pnt , Bnt ∪ {pnt }).





t ∪ {pnt }|ht−1) = ρt(pt;At|ht−1),
as required. 
Lemma 15. Suppose that ρ satisfies Axiom 2. Fix t ≥ 1, At ∈ At, ht−1 = (A0, p0, . . . , At−1, pt−1) ∈
Ht−1, and λ = (λn)t−1n=0, λ̂ = (λ̂n)
t−1
n=0 ∈ (0, 1]t. Suppose dt−1 = ({qn}, qn)
t−1
n=0, d̂
t−1 = ({q̂n}, q̂n)t−1n=0 ∈
Dt−1 satisfy λht−1 + (1 − λ)dt−1, λ̂ht−1 + (1 − λ̂)d̂t−1 ∈ Ht−1(At), where λht−1 + (1 − λ)dt−1 :=
(λnAn + (1− λn){qn}, λnpn + (1− λn)qn)t−1n=0 and λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)d̂t−1 is defined analogously. Then
ρt(·;At|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1) = ρt(·;At|λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)d̂t−1),
and hence, ρh
t−1
t (·;At) = ρt(·;At|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1).
Proof. Let k := max{n = 0 . . . , t− 1 : qn 6= q̂n} be the last entry at which dt−1 and d̂t−1 differ, where
we set k = −1 if qn = q̂n for all n = 0, . . . , t− 1. We prove the claim by induction on k.
Suppose first that k = −1, i.e., that dt−1 = d̂t−1. If λ0 > λ̂0, then the 0-th entry of λht−1 +
(1 − λ)dt−1 can be written as an appropriate mixture of the 0-th entry of λ̂ht−1 + (1 − λ̂)d̂t−1 with
(A0, p0); if λ0 ≤ λ̂0, then the 0-th entry of λht−1 + (1 − λ)dt−1 can be written as an appropriate
mixture of the 0-th entry of λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)d̂t−1 with ({q0}, q0). In either case, Axiom 2 implies that
ρt(·;At|λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)d̂t−1) is unaffected after replacing the 0-th entry of λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)d̂t−1 with the
0-th entry of λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1. Continuing this way, we can successively apply Axiom 2 to replace
each entry of λ̂ht−1 +(1− λ̂)d̂t−1 with the corresponding entry of λht−1 +(1−λ)dt−1 without affecting
ρt. This yields the desired conclusion.
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Suppose the claim holds whenever k ≤ m − 1 for some 0 ≤ m ≤ t − 1. We show that the claim























































Indeed, we can find a sequence of lotteries (`n)
t−1
n=0 such that for all n = 1, . . . , t− 1








































t−1 := ({on}, on)t−1n=0 and ĉt−1 := ({ôn}, ôn)
t−1
n=0,
we have that ct−1, ĉt−1 ∈ Dt−1, λht−1 + (1−λ)ct−1, λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)ĉt−1 ∈ Ht−1(At), and the last entry
at which ct−1 and ĉt−1 differ is m. Moreover, repeated application of Axiom 2 implies
ρt(·;At|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1) = ρt(·;At|λht−1 + (1− λ)ct−1);
ρt(·;At|λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)d̂t−1) = ρt(·;At|λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)ĉt−1).




t−1 + 12 d̂
t−1 ∈ Ht−1(At), so the base case of the proof implies





























































































































































3 q̂m)) is an entry-wise mixture of h
t−1 with




















3qm)) is an entry-wise mixture of h
t−1 with the degenerate his-
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2 q̂m). But the last entry at which e
t−1 and êt−1 differ is








































Combining (26), (27), and (28) yields the required equality
ρt(·;At|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1) = ρt(·;At|λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)d̂t−1).
Finally, let d̂t−1 and λ̂ ∈ (0, 1] be the choices from Definition 10 such that ρht−1t (·;At) :=
ρt(·;At|λ̂ht−1 + (1− λ̂)d̂t−1). Then the above implies that ρh
t−1
t (·;At) = ρt(·;At|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1),
as claimed. 
Lemma 16. Fix t = 0, . . . , T . Suppose (St′ , {µ
st′−1
t′ }st′−1∈St′−1 , {Ust′ , τst′}st′∈St′ ) satisfy DREU1 and
DREU2 for all t′ ≤ t. Then the extended version of ρ from Definition 3 also satisfies DREU2 for all
t′ ≤ t, i.e., for all pt′ , At′ , and ht
′−1 = (A0, p0, . . . , At′−1, pt′−1) ∈ Ht′−1,57 we have















′−1 ∈ Ht′−1(At′), the claim is immediate from DREU2. So suppose ht
′−1 /∈ Ht′−1(At′). Let
λ ∈ (0, 1) and dt′−1 = ({q`}, q`)t
′−1
`=0 ∈ Dt′−1 be the choices from Definition 3 such that λh
t′−1 + (1 −
λ)dt
′−1 ∈ Ht′−1(At′) and ρt′(pt′ , At′ |ht
′−1) := ρt′(pt′ , At′ |λht
′−1 + (1− λ)dt′−1).
Note that for all k ≤ t′, sk ∈ Sk, and w ∈ RXk , we have pk ∈ M(M(Ak, Usk), w) if and only if
λpk + (1− λ)qk ∈M(M(λAk + (1− λ){qk}, Usk), w). Hence, τsk(pk, Ak) = τsk(λpk + (1− λ)qk, λAk +
(1 − λ){qk}). Thus, the claim follows from DREU2 applied to the history λht
′−1 + (1 − λ)dt′−1 ∈
Ht′−1(At′). 
Lemma 17. Fix t = 0, . . . , T . Suppose (St′ , {µ
st′−1
t′ }st′−1∈St′−1 , {Ust′ , τst′}st′∈St′ ) satisfy DREU1 and
DREU2 for all t′ ≤ t. Fix any st−1 ∈ St−1, separating history ht−1 for st−1, and At ∈ At. Then there
exists a sequence Ant →m At such that Ant ∈ A∗t+1(ht) for all n. Moreover, given any s∗t ∈ suppµ
st−1
t




t ) ∈ Ant with pnt (s∗t )→m p∗t
such that Ust(Ant , pnt (s∗t )) = {Us∗t } for all n.
Proof. Let St(st−1) := suppµ
st−1
t . By DREU1, we can find a finite Yt ⊆ Xt such that (i) for any st ∈
St(st−1), Ust is non-constant over Yt; (ii) for any distinct st, s
′
t ∈ St(st−1), Ust 6≈ Us′t over Yt; and (iii)⋃
pt∈At supppt ⊆ Yt. By (i) and (ii) and Lemma 13, we can find a menu Dt := {q
st
t : st ∈ St(st−1)} ⊆




|Yt|δy ∈ ∆(Y ). For each
st ∈ St(st−1), pick zst ∈ argmaxy∈Y Ust and let gstt := δzst . By (i), we have Ust(g
st
t ) > Ust(bt) for all
st ∈ St(st−1). Hence, there exists α ∈ (0, 1) small enough such that for all st ∈ St(st−1), we have
Ust(q̂
st) > Ust(bt), where q̂
st := αqstt + (1−α)g
st
t . Note that setting D̂ := {q̂
st
t : st ∈ St(st−1)}, we still
have M(D̂t, Ust) = {q̂stt }.
For each st ∈ St(st−1), pick some pt(st) ∈ M(At, Ust). For the “moreover” part, we can ensure
that pt(s
∗
t ) = p
∗
t . Fix any sequence (εn) from (0, 1) such that εn → 0. For each n and st ∈ St(st−1),
let pnt (st) := (1 − ε)pt(st) + εq̂
st
t . And for each rt ∈ At, let rnt := (1 − ε)rt + εbt. Finally, let
57For t′ = 0, we abuse notation by letting ρt′(·|ht
′−1) denote ρ0(·) for all ht
′−1.
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Ant := {pnt (st) : st ∈ St(st−1)} ∪ {rnt : rt ∈ At}. Note that Ant →m At. Moreover, by construction, for
all st ∈ St(st−1) and n, we have M(Ant , Ust) = {pnt (st)}: Indeed, Ust(pnt (st)) > Ust(rnt ) for all rt ∈ At
since Ust(pt(st)) ≥ Ust(rt) and Ust(q̂stt ) > Ust(bt); and Ust(pnt (st)) > Ust(pnt (s′t)) for all s′t 6= st, since
Ust(pt(st)) ≥ Ust(pt(s′t)) and Ust(q̂stt ) > Ust(q̂
s′t
t ).
Since st−1 is the only state consistent with h
t−1, Lemma 14 implies that Ant ∈ A∗t (ht−1), as required.
Finally, for the “moreover” part, note that we ensured that pt(s
∗
t ) = p
∗





above has the desired property that pnt (s
∗
t )→m p∗t and Ust(Ant , pnt (s∗t )) = {Us∗t } for all n. 
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